A framework for regulating microfinance institutions by van Greuning, Hennie et al.
WPS 4.DO
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2061
A Framework for Regulating  Is  there a  need to regulate
microfinance institutions?  If
Microfinance Institutions  so, what  activities  should be
regulated?  Who should
regulate them? And what
Hennie  van Greuning






















































































































d'  POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2061
Summary findings
The continuum of institutions providing microfinance  *  Those that depend on other peoples' money (such as
cannot develop fully without a regulatory environment  donor  or public sector funding).
conducive to their growth. Without such an  *  Those that depend on members' money.
environment, fragmentation  and segmentation will  *  Those that leverage the general public's money to
continue to inhibit the institutional transformation of  fund microfinance loans.
microfinance institutions.  For each category, the model highlights:
Van Greuning, Gallardo, and Randhawa recommend a  *  The observed value ranges for selected indicators of
tiered approach to external regulation, one that takes  financial risk.
into account the different types of microfinance  *  Recommended ranges of value suitable for
institutions, the products they offer, and the markets  consideration under internal governance.
they service. A tiered approach can be useful in designing  * Suggested threshold values that indicate the need for
regulatory standards that recognize the basic differences  external regulation.
in structure of capital, funding, and risks faced by  A transparent, inclusive framework for regulation will
different kinds of microfinance institutions.  preserve the market specialties of different types of
The model they develop for a regulatory framework  microfinance institutions-and  will promote their
identifies thresholds of financial intermediation  activities,  ultimate integration into the formal financial system.
thresholds that trigger the requirement that an institution  One example of the kind of regulation the authors
satisfy external or mandatory regulatory guidelines. It  recommend: Require standard registration documents
focuses on risk-taking activities that must be managed  and procedures-no  different from those required of
and regulated.  regular corporations-including  the designation of a
They illustrate the usefulness of the model by  central government agency with which they should
practically applying prudential considerations to various  register as corporate entities.
categories and values of financial risk for each of three
broad categories of microfinance institution:
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1.  This paper seeks to  provide a  framework for  addressing regulatory issues which  impact
operations  and institutional  development  of microfinance  institutions  (MFIs). Arguing  against universal
regulation or creating separate specialized  regulations,  the approach in this paper uses the analysis of
MFIs' liabilities  to highlight the distinguishing  features  of different types ofMFIs and focuses on risk-
taking activities that need to be managed and regulated.  The  continuum  of MFIs can be classified into
three broad categories:  (i) MFIs which depend  on other  peoples' money (Category  A), (ii) MFIs which
depend on members' money (Category  B), and (iii) MFIs which leverage  the public's money (Category
C) to fund microfinance loans.  The continuum of institutions providing  microfinance in a  financial
systems  context cannot develop  without  a conducive  regulatory  environment.  Instead,  fragmentation  and
segmentation  will continue  to inhibitMFIs' institutional  transformation.  Hence,  this paper  recommends  a
tiered approach to external regulation  which takes into account the different cafegories and types of
MFIs.
2.  Financial systems as a whole continue to evolve and find new ways to service demands for
financial services in the emerging markets. The innovative  and rapid development  of many localized
efforts to provide  financial  services  to the poor outside  of formal channels  has generally  overtaken  taken
policy formulation  by governments. The reaction of some governments  and multilateral agencies is
unfavorable  to microfinance  - comprehensive  regulation  is being proposed for microfinance  activities
and institutions  through mandated  standards  of performance  and r  isk-ratios. These proposals  are based
on untested hypothesis about the institutional and market impact of moving from an  unregulated
environment  to one that is as tightly  regulated  as formal  banks and financial  institutions.
3.  The structure  of liabilities  highlights  the primary  sources  of funding  forMFIs: contributed  equity
capital, donor funds, concessional and commercial  borrowings,  rnembers' savings, wholesale deposits
from institutional  investors and retail savings  and sight deposits from the public. The important  factors
that differentiate  MFIs from each other  are therefore  found  mainly on the liabilities  side rather than on the
asset side of the balance sheet. From a regulator's point of view, it is the source of funding that
differentiates  a licensed  bank MFI from a non-bank  MFI.
4.  A risk-based  approach  to financial  regulation  focuses  on the same  issues that good managers  and
boards of directors  should be concerned  with in managing an MF][. Aside from highlighting  the central
role of institutional  capital, the approach  helps in identifying  the risks that prudential  regulation  should
address. The approach  can be useful in designing  regulatory standards that recognize the fundamental
differences in the structure of capital, funding and risks faced by MFIs.  This paper's  model of a
regulatory  framework  uses the risk-based  approach  to regulation  and addresses  the following questions:
*  Is there a need to regulate  MFIs?
*  If so, what activities  should  be regulated?
*  Who should  regulate  MFI operations?
*  What are the fundamental  issues  in the regulation  of MFIs?
5.  The paper points out the benefits from a transparent  and inclusive  regulatory framework  within
which MFIs can progressively  evolve  into formal  financial  institutions. The paper develops  a regulatory
framework  model to identify  thresholds  of financial  intermediation  activities  which  trigger a requirement
for an MFI to satisfy external or mandatory  regulatory  guidelines.  As financial  institutions,  it is prudent
for all of the different types of MFIs to observe internal or voluntary  guidelines  for risk management.
The table below summarizes  the regulatory  framework  model -- indicating  the fund-generating  activitiesof different  types of MFIs  which  trigger a need  for mandatory  external guidelines,  and  the proposed
regulatory measures and agencies to carry them out.
Regulatory  Thresholds  of Activities  by Type  of Microfinance  Institution
MFI Type  Activity  that  Determines  Proposed  Form  of  External  Regulation,  Regulatory  Agency
Regulatory  Status  if Required
CATEGORYA  MFls  _________________________,-_
Type  I  Making  microfinance  loans  not  in  excess  None  - Voluntary  registration  with  Self-  None,  or Self-Regulatory
Basic  Nonprofit  NGO  of grants  and  donated/  concessional  Regulatory  Organization.  Organization.
funds  (loan  capital).
Type  2  Taking  minor  deposits,  e.g.  forced  None  -- Exemption  or  exclusion  provision  of  Self-Regulatory
Nonprofit  NGO  with  savings  or mandatory  deposit  schemes,  banking  law;  compulsory  registration  with  Self  Organization.
limited  deposit-taking from  microfinance  clients  in  community.  Regulatory  Organization.
Type  3  Issuing  instruments  to  generate  funds  Registration  as  corporate  legal  entity;  Compainies'  Registry
NGO  transformed  into  through  wholesale  deposit  substitutes  authorization  from  Bank  Supervisory  Authority Agency:  Bank
Incorporated  MFI  (commercial  paper,  large-value  or Securities  & Exchange  Agency,  with  Supervisory  Authority  or
certificates  of  deposit,  investment  limitations  on size,  term  and  tradability  of  Securities  & Exchange
placement  notes).  commercial  paper  instruments.  Agency.
CATEGORY  B MFIs  _  _  _  _  _  _  __._A___  __  . _;_--  _  - _  . 5  ;  ,  __  _i_  r  \  f  ,  _-_-.
Type  4  Operating  as  closed-  or open-common  Notification  to  and  registration  with  Cooperatives  Authority,  or
Credit  Union,  Savings  bond  credit  union;  deposit-taking  from  Cooperatives  Authority  or Bank  Supervisory  Bank  Supervisory  Agency
&  Credit  Cooperative  member-clients  in the  community,  Authority:  or certification  and  rating  by  a  or Credit  Rating  Entity.
Society  workplace  or trade.  private  independent  credit  rating  agency.
CATEGORY  C MFIs  _  1  -*%  '-<  ,  e  L.77
Type  5  Taking  limited  deposits  (e.g.  savings  &  Registration  and  licensing  by  Bank  Bank  Supervisory
Specialized  Bank,  fixed  deposits)  from  general  public  Supervisory  Authority,  with a  limitation  Authority.
Deposit-taking  beyond  minor  deposits  exemption  in  provision  (e.g.,  savings  & fixed  deposits,
Institution,  or  banking  law.  Microfinance  activities  more  smaller  deposits-to-capital  multiple,  higher
Finance  Company  extensive  than  NGOs  but  operations  not  liquidity  reserves,  limits  on  asset  activities  and
on  scale  of  licensed  banks.  uses).
Type  6  Non-restricted  deposit-taking  activities,  Registration  and  full  licensing  by  Bank  Bank  Supervisory
Licensed  Mutual-  including  generating  funds  through  Supervisory  Authority  as  a mutual-ownership  Authority.
Ownership  Bank  commercial  paper  and  large-value  or  equity  bank;  compliance  with  capitalization
Type  7  deposit-substitutes,  from  the  general  / capital  adequacy  requirements,  loan  loss
Licensed  Equity  Bank  public.  provisioning  and  full  prudential  regulations.
6.  The categories  of  risk which  financial  institutions  including MFIs need  to manage  comprise
balance sheet structure risk, profitability risk, solvency/capital adequacy risk, credit risk, treasury risks
(consisting of liquidity risk, interest rate risk, market risk, and currency exposure) and operational  risk.
The nature of the microfinance business and the institutional structure of MFIs  determine  the priority
ranking of risks that need to be managed. The processes of internal regulation through governance  and
mandatory external regulation are closely linked to each other. Several key players from the MFI sector,
the regulatory agencies and the general public have a critical partnership and shared responsibility  in the
risk management process.
7.  The approaches to external supervision of MFIs can range from nonexistent to full regulation,
either  through  the  existing  prudential  regulatory  framework or by  modifying  the  existing  regulatory
requirements to fit the organizational and operating characteristics of MFIs.  A primary  example of the
adaptive approach is "tiered banking" and graduated regulation - a structure which takes into account the
defining characteristics of the microfinance business and the varied range of  MFIs involved in it.
ii8.  A second example  is the initiative  by leading credit unions in Guatemala,  with the assistance of
World Council  of Credit  Unions  (WOCCU)  and the Consultative  Group  to Assist the Poorest (CGAP),  to
establish an independent  credit rating and certification  agency  for credit unions. Similar  to the operation
of credit rating agencies in capital markets, the private rating agency that is being established has no
statutory  authority but can wield significant  power if investors  and lenders  respect its independence  and
credibility.
9.  The paper concludes  by identifying  measures  to preserve the market specializations  that MFIs
have and to  promote their linkage and integration with the formal financial system. Even when a
supportive  macroeconomic  environment  exists,  MFIs may face obstacles  from accounting  specifications,
tax and fiscal regulations that discriminate  against  microfinance. Developing packages of financial
services suited to the microfinance market requires coordinated  efforts among donors, governments,
microfinance  practitioners  and institutions,  and target clients  of themicroenterprises  and small  businesses
themselves. Coordination  among  the key participants  can be enhanced  by dialogue  and dissemination  of
commonly  understood  measures  that clarify regulatory  aspects  in the provision  of financial services  and
establish an  environment under which MFIs can  follow an  orderly progression to  institutional
development.
iiiI.  Introduction,  Objectives  and Structure  of the Paper
Background
1.  Banks in developing countries typically serve no more than 20% of the population leaving the rest
with little, if any, access to financial services.  The unserved majority which employs as much as 60% of
the economically active population depends on informal and semi-formal sources of finance. Most of the
entities  providing  microfinance  services  are  non-formal  and  serni-formal institutions  not  subject  to
prudential  regulations  which  apply to banks and  other formal-sector institutions.  The ability of most
microfinance institutions (MFIs) to leverage capital and mobilize external resources is generally limited.
To support outreach to low-income clients, donated resources are generally leveraged and augmented by
borrowing  from formal financial institutions or large institutional and individual investors, or accepting
limited deposits from the public.
2.  A  broad  range  of  institutional  channels  for  microfinance  target  different  segments  of  the
microenterprise  and  small  business  (MSB)  market.  In  some  countries  such  as  Bolivia,  Indonesia,
Philippines, Bangladesh and Sri Lankal, licensed specialized and regular commercial banks participate in
providing financial services to the MSB sector. However, the global experience shows a rapid but uneven
pattern  of institutional, and inconsistent application of regulatory principles. The range of  institutional
channels for microfinance in most countries is limited to NGOs and credit cooperative societies.2
Objectives
3.  The main objective of this paper is to provide a framework for addressing regulatory issues which
impact MFI operations  and institutional development. The paper notes the disadvantages  of creating  a
separate set of regulations for specialized treatment, or of universal regulation ofMFIs.  The paper shows
that existing regulatory principles can be adapted to address coverage appropriate for MFIs and  those
activities that may need to be regulated. The paper could be useful in developing guidelines to establish a
regulatory  environment which  permits MFIs  to progressively evolve into institutions  capable  of wider
outreach and achieving critical mass in operations. A continuum of institutions providing microfinance  in
a  financial  systems  context  cannot  develop  without  conducive  regulatory  environment.  Instead,
fragmentation and segmentation will continue to inhibit the institutional transformation of MFIs.
4.  Earlier efforts have been made to establish and promote a cormmon understanding of microfinance
activities among regulatory authorities who have reacted to the rise ofmicrofinance services by enacting
legal measures - ranging from the marginalist and ad hoc to full intervention. 3  In addition, there  have
I  The Indonesian experience in village banking is discussed in James Boomgard and Kenneth Angell, "Bank Rakyat Indonesia's
Unit Desa System:  Achievements and  Replicability",  in Otero and Rhyne,  eds.,  The New  World of  Microenterprise
Finance:  Building  Healthy  Financial  Institutions  for  the  Poor.  West  Hartford,  CT.  Kumarian  Press,  1994.  The
microfinance  experience of Panama's  Multi Credit Bank is discussed by  Rachel Rock, Carlos  Castello and  Vivienne
Azarcon  in  "Other  Microfinance  Institution Experience with Regulation",  in Rock and Otero,  eds., From  Margin  to
Mainstream:  The Regulation  and  Supervision of  Microfinance  Institutions,  Washington,  DC:  ACCION  International,
1997.  Sri Lanka's  experience with commercial bank downscaling into miurofinance is discussed  in Joselito  Gallardo,
Bikki Randhawa and Orlando Sacay, A Commercial Bank's Microfinance Experience: The Case of Hatton National Bank
in Sri Lanka", Discussion Paper No. 369, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1997.
2  "Financial  Assistance  and  Other  Programs  to  Support  Low-income Entrepreneurs:  An  Introductory  Guide",  Economic
Development Institute (report prepared by Silvia Dorado-Banacloche), Washington, DC: The World Bank, August  1996
(Draft).
3  The countries which have recently taken legislation and regulation  initiatives (with varying degrees  of coverage)  include
South Africa, Zambia, Uganda, Malawi, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
1been initiatives to regulate the provision of microfinance services, as well as the establishment and
operations  of all MFIs. 4 This paper's approach  differs  by (i) using the liabilities  side of the balance  sheet
to underscore  the distinguishing  features of different  MFIs in sourcing funds, and (ii) highlighting the
asset side of the balance sheet  to focus on the risk-taking  activities  in the uses of those funds that need to
be managed and regulated. The usefulness of the risk-based approach to financial management and
regulation  is demonstrated  through:
*  Establishing  a fundamental  framework  for determining  which activities, types of MFIs
and forms of regulation  and supervision  are appropriate;
*  Highlighting  the underlying  regulatory  guidelines  for different types ofMFIs which can
preserve  and enhance  the flexibility  possible  with informal  methods;
*  Identifying measures to promote the linkage and integration  of MFIs with thle  formal
financial  system in order to diminish  the segmentation  in financial  markets.
Structure
5.  Chapter II of the paper presents a summary of the operational and structural characteristics ofMFIs
at  different  stages  of  development,  from  specialized NGOs  outside  the  banking  system  to  licensed
financial institutions subject to prudential regulation.  This section highlights the factors Nvhich  are
important  for good risk management  and discusses  the importance  of financial  statements  in assessing  the
need for regulation  and the impact  of fragmented  regulation  on institutional  development.
6.  Chapter III presents the model of a regulatory framework  to examine the rationale for regulating
selected  activities of certain  types of MFIs. The discussion  addresses  the following  basic questions:
*  Is there a need to regulate  MFIs?
*  If so, what activities should be regulated, and
*  Who should regulate MFI operations?
*  What are the fundamental  issues  in the regulation  of MFIs?
7.  Chapter IV focuses on the basic principles of risk management as a continuing, dynamic process, as
opposed  to  static  ratio  management.  The  risk  management  categories  discussed  are  balance  sheet
structure, profitability, capital adequacy, credit risk (such as loan administration, portfolio management
and loan  loss provisioning  practices),  liquidity risk,  interest rate  risk, market  risk, currency  risk  and
operational risk. This paper uses the financial statements of different types of MFIs to illustrate the key
values, ratios  and relationships  of items in the balance sheet and income statement as diagnostic tools
which are relevant to risk management and regulatory issues.
8.  Chapter  V  summarizes  the  regulatory  issues  discussed  and  the  major  conclusions  and
recommendations  drawn  from  the  analysis.  The  section  includes  a  discussion  of  "tiered"  banking
structures and graduated regulation, 5 as well as a brief summary of innovative approaches in self-
4  References  are made  to Rachel  Rock and Maria  Otero,  op cit;  Robert  P. Christen,  "Issues  in the Regulation  and Supervision
of Microfinance",  paper presented  at ACCION  International  conference,  Washington,  DC, November 1995; rhe World
Bank, Consultative  Group  to Assist the Poorest (CGAP),  Focus Note Series, "Regulation  and Supervision  of Micro-
Finance  Institutions:  Stabilizing  a New  Financial  Market"  (No.  4, August 1996);  Craig Churchill  and Shari  Berenbach,  The
Regulation  and Supervision  of Microfinance  Institutions,  Washington,  DC: MicroFinance  Network,  February  1997.
5 Banking laws provide for "tiered" banking structures  and graduated  regulation  in Bolivia, El Salvador,  NicareLgua,  Peru,
Indonesia,  Philippines,  Sri Lanka,  Georgia  and Uganda  among  others.
2regulation through a market-based  private rating and certification  institution 6 and through umbrella
organizations.  The discussion also brings out the need to better synchronize sponsors', donors' and
regulators' requirements for reports and information which are indispensable to  risk-management
processes in MFIs, particularly in the use of performance  indicators for MFIs within relevant peer
groupings.
6  This is the initiative  of leading credit unions in Guatemala,  with the assistance  of the World Council of Credit Unions
(WOCCU)  and the Consultative  Group  to Assist  the Poorest  (CGAP)  to establish  a private credit  rating and certification
agency.
3II. Using Financial  Statements  to Determine  the Need for Regulation
Characteristics  and types of microfinance  institutions  (MFIs)
9.  The organizational  characteristics  and business operations of microenterprises and small businesses
(MSBs) influence the types and formats of financial services provided by MFIs.  Although MSBs have
differing  demands  depending  on  specific country  situations,  the  features  common  to  them  are  low-
technology,  labor-intensive  activities,  limited  access  to  financing  from  the  formal  sector,  lack  of
conventional forms of collateral and accounting records and concentration of business activities in poor
urban  and  semi-urban  areas.  The  financing  required  is  mostly  for  short-term  working  capital,  in
relatively small amounts.
10. Traditional sources of finance for MSBs are family and friends and the informal markets -- rotating
savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), various "club" systems pooling members'  savings for loans,7
village banks, buyers'  advances (in cash or in kind), and moneylenders.  There may be some access to
semi-formal microfinance  institutions (legally organized financial intermediaries which are not regulated
by the monetary authorities) such as non-profit NGOs, larger village banks, suppliers who provide trade
credit,  and  pawnbrokers.  Formal  MFIs  comprise  savings  and  credit  cooperatives,  credit  unions,
incorporated NGOs,  finance companies, and specialized  and regular banks.  The latter inclucdes  banks
established  by NGOs,  or "windows"  and  departments  created by  commercial  banks  to  handle  MSB
business.  Chart 1 in the page following summarizes the organizational and market-niche  characteristics
of different types of MFIs.
11. MFI  loans to  informally-organized businesses  are numerous but  in  small amounts  for  short-term
periods, with  the aggregate  loan portfolio  turning  over several times during  the year.  The loans are
generally unsecured, with simple repayment structures and documentation requirements, and at interest
rates generally higher than those in the formal sector.  In contrast, regular loans of commercial banks are
fewer in number  and for larger amounts. The majority of commercial bank loans are forrnally secured,
with more complex structures and short- to medium- term maturities.
12. Commercial  banks  could be  significant players  in microfinance  because  of  the  advantages  from
branch office infrastructure and systems and the ability to mobilize resources from the public.  However,
they generally do not have the product lines, loan procedures, operating cost structures and staff skills to
make a profit from numerous but smaller-sized microfinance loans. The lack of an information  base on
the MSB market as well as difficulties in enforcing loan contracts contribute to their limited participation
in microfinance.  Only  a  handful of commercial banks  have been  able to carry  out a  downscaling  of
regular banking operations to reach MSBs. 8
13. Chart  1 on the next page shows the characteristics of semi-formal and formal MFIs, which may be
classified into three broad categories9 based on their main sources of funding.  Category A MFIs which
7 Some  country  examples  are stokvels  in South  Africa,  tontines  and susu  in West  Africa,  iqqubs  in Ethiopia,  ke in Korea,  and
arisan  in Indonesia.
8  Notable  among  commercial  banks downscaling  regular  banking  operations  into  profitable  microfinance  programs  are Hatton
National  Bank in Sri Lanka and Multi Credit Bank in Panama. See Gallardo,  Randhawa  and Sacay, op. cit. and Rock,
Castello  and Azarcon,  op.  cit.
9  William  F. Steel has suggested  that MFIs be classified  into three broad  categories,  based on their use of (i) other peoples'
money (grants  and donations),  (ii) members'  money  (share  capital  contributions  and savings),  and (iii) the general public's
money (retail  deposits). We have  adopted  the use of these  categories  in the regulatory  framework  model  developed  in this
paper.
4Chart 1.  Distinguishing  Characteristics of Types of MFIs in the Continuum
Legal Form of  Basis for  Ownership  Governance  Main Source of Funds
Type of MFI  Organization  Establishment  for Operations & Loans  Market Niche
Category  A: MFIs
Using Other  .Z
Peoples'  Money  _____________
Type I  NonProfit NGO  Social Services Law,  Foreign & Local Donors,  Board of  Grants and Donations  Specifically-defined
NonProfit NGO  Trustees' Ordinance  through a Trust  Trustees  Urban or Rural Low-
Income Area
Type 2  Social Services Law,  Foreign & Local Donors,  Board of  Grants and Donations,  Specifically-defined
NonProfit NGO with  NonProfit NGO  Trustees' Ordinance +  through a Trust  Trustees  Limited Deposit-Taking  Urban or Rural Low-
limited deposit-taking  Registration  with  Income Area
Central NGO Body
Type 3  NonProfit  Limited  Companies'  Individual persons and/or  Board of  Grants and Donations,  Specifically-defined
NGO transformed into  Liability Stock or  Registration Law  Institutions as members  Directors  Limited Deposit-Taking,  Urban or Rural Low-
Incorporated MFI  Non-Stock company  or stockholders  Concessional and  Income Area
Commercial Borrowings
Category  B: MFis  ;  e
Using  Members'  .......  ...
M  oney  ~  ~  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Type 4-A  Closed Common  Law on Cooperative  One-man one-vote  Board of  Members' Share Capital  Specifically-defined
Credit Union, Savings  Bond Association  Societies or Savings &  membership limited to  Directors  Contributions and Savings  Urban or Rural
& Credit Cooperative  Credit Associations  natural persons sharing  Deposits  Community or Place
Society  strictly-defined interests  of Employment
(village or employment).
Type 4-B  Open Common  Law on Cooperative  One-man one-vote  Board of  Members' Share Capital  Broadly-defined
Credit Union, Savings  Bond Association  Societies  or Savings &  membership limited to  Directors  Contributions and Savings  Urban or Rural
& Credit Cooperative  Credit Associations  natural persons sharing  Deposits  Communities or
Society  broadly-defined interests  Fmn!oyment  RPrs
(trade, craft or large
geographical area).
CategoryC:  MFIs  Z
Using  the Piublic's 
Money  - ~t,«'~4~ 
Type 5  Limited Liability  Companies' registration  Individual persons and/or  Board of  Savings deposits,  Regional or National
Specialized Bank,  Stock Company  law; Limited license  Institutions  Directors  Wholesale Funds and  Market Area
Deposit-taking  issued by Bank  as members or  Commercial Borrowings
Institution,  or  Regulatory Authority  stockholders
Finance Company
Type 6  Limited Liability  Companies' registration  Individual persons and/or  Board of  Retail Deposits from the  Regional or National
Licensed Mutual-  Stock or Non-Stock  law; Full license issued  Institutions  Directors  General Public, Wholesale  Market Area
Ownership Bank  Company  by Bank Regulatory  as members or  Funds and Commercial
Type 7  Authority  stockholders  Borrowings
Licensed Equity Bank  .use  other peoples'  money comprise (i) non-profit NGOs using grants  and donations to providLe  micro-
loans (Type  1), (ii) non-profit  NGOs that augment  grants  and  donations with members'  savings  and
limited borrowings from commercial banks (Type 2), and (iii) non-profitNGOs  that have changed their
organizational  format  into  incorporated  entities  and  exercised  some  leverage  by  mobilizing  some
"wholesale" funds through wholesale deposits, commercial paper or bank credit lines (Type 3).
*  Type I - a non-profit NGO, organized as a self-help organization (SHO), people's  voluntary
organization  (PVO) or  association, whose capital  and  funding for  lending  operations  are
sourced mainly from grant funds provided by donors.
*  Type  2 - a  non-profit  NGO, organized as a SHO, PVO, association  or  foundation  which
augments donor funds by accepting limited or minor deposits from members (similar to the
practice in village banks) and accessing limited borrowings from commercial banks.
*  Type  3 - a non-profit NGO which has changed into an incorporated format and  mobilizes
wholesale  funds through commercial paper issues or wholesale deposits to augment  minor
deposits, commercial bank loans, grants and concessional funds from government.
14. Category B formal MFIs which use members' money consist of membership-based credit unions and
savings  and  credit  cooperative  associations  whose  services  are  limited  exclusively  or  primarily  to
members (Type 4).  The credit union or savings and credit cooperative society may be registered on the
basis of an open- or closed-common bond membership.  Generally, more than half of its total funding for
financial services to members is generated from members' savings and share capital contribution,s.
15. The formal  MFIs  in Category C which  use the general  public's  money consist  of  (i) corporate
entities authorized  to operate as specialized banks or finance companies (Type 5), (ii)  licensed  banks
with mutual  ownership  of capital by  members (Type 6) and  (iii) licensed  regular banks  with  equity
capital owned by individual investors (Type 7).
*  Type 5 - a registered business corporation licensed by a regulatory authority to operate either
as  a  specialized  bank,  limited deposit-taking  company or  finance  company  permitted  to
accept  limited deposits  from the public  (e.g.,  savings  and  fixed  deposits),  in  addition to
wholesale  funds and commercial borrowings to support microfinance and other operations.
The regulatory agency generally imposes a minimum capitalization level upon entry into the
limited deposit-taking activity.
*  Type 6 - a licensed regular bank whose share capital is mutually owned by members, and
*  Type  7  - a  licensed  regular  bank  with  individually-owned  shares  of  capital  which  is
authorized to mobilize retail deposits from the general public.  Type 6 and Type 7MFIs are
subject  to  prudential  guidelines  on  minimum  capitalization  and  capital  adequacy;
qualification of directors and officers; mandatory reserve requirements and deposit insurance;
portfolio  aging, loan classification and loan loss provisioning; as well as periodic reporting
requirements and disclosure standards.
The financial statement approach
16. The structure and composition of financial statements is useful for distinguishing the types; ofMFIs
according to the differences in the risks  that they need  to manage.  With respect to the balance  sheet
structure, the composition  of assets  indicates the  uses of resources that have  been  generated  and the
underlying risks in those various uses. Net loans and short-term investments -- earning assets -- generally
comprise the majority of total assets in an MFI's  balance sheet.  There may be cases, however, where
non-earning assets (such as real property and equipment) make up a  significant portion of total  assets.
6The liabilities side of an MFI's balance sheet indicates the scurces of funding to support the assets
generated  in its microfinance  operations  as well as the extent to which the institution's capital has been
leveraged  to mobilize  funds.
17. The structure  of liabilities  highlights  the extent of an MFI's funding from public and private sources.
The primary sources  of funding for MFIs are contributed  equity capital, donor funds,  concessional  and
commercial  borTowings,  members' savings, wholesale deposits from institutional investors, and retail
savings and sight deposits  from the public. The important  factors  that differentiateMFIs  from each other
are found mainly on the liabilities side rather than on the asset side of the balance sheet. From a
regulator's perspective  it is primarily  the source  offunding that differentiates  a licensed  bank MFI from a
non-bank MFI.  Sample values of liabilities for different types of MFIs in the continuum  are shown in
Table 1 below to highlight the differences  in the structure  of liabilities. The values used do not refer to
any particular  currencies,  but illustrate  the relationship  in the value of a particular  liability item to total
liabilities as the basis for identifying  a threshold  value that triggers a need for regulatory coverage. The
liability-generating  activities and their corresponding  threshold  values are explained  in the Notes which
accompany  the Table.
Table  1.  Sample Threshold Values of Liabilities  for Continuum of MFis
Basic  Non-Profit  NGO  trans-  Credit  Specialized  Licensed  Licensed
Non-  NGO  with  formed int,o  Union  Bank  or  Mutual  Equity
Types of MFIs  Profit  Limited  Incorp-  Limited  Owner-  Bank
NGO  Deposit  - orated  Deposit  ship
Taking  MFI  Taking  Bank
I________  __________  Institution
1  2  3  4  5  6  7
LIABILITIES
Retail funding  from members / the public  20  0  260  400  460  600
Minor  deposits  (informal finance)  i  20  10  (11 50
M  embers'  d  eposits  10220  5  610  8  )  202
Retail/public  deposits  (5  f |S1  ) 240  (X) 300  X  500
wholesale  deposit  instruments)  E  EN(0@10(  0  )10G  0
Non public  funding  150  160  0  0  230  200  200
Donor  loans  (concessionai  rate)  40  30  30  20  30  30 
Government  loans  (concessional  rate)  10  10  _  10  10  M
Commercial  bank  loans  (market-rate)  100  100  1()0  100  200  200  250
Total  Funding  Liabilities  150  180  2,0  490  730  840  1,000
Other  liabilities  (no  financial  cost)  10  10  _10  10  10  10  10
TOTAL  LIABILITIES  160  190  280  500  740  850  1060
CAPITAL  _
Paid  in capitai  I  members'  shares  10  20  125  60  (B  80  S  120  (B  200
Donated  capital  50  50  b020200  m 
Preferred  capital  / subordinated  govt.  funds  30  30  :30  30  30  30  ....  ;
Retained  earnings  /  surplus  /  reserves  0  1 0  '15  20  30  30  40
TOTAL  CAPITAL  90  110  1:20  150  160  200  240
TOTAL  LIABILITIES  8  CAPITAL  250  1  300  400  650  900  1,050  1,300
7Accompanying  Notes  to Table  1:
The symbols  marked  on liability  and capital  items  and values indicate  microfinance  activities  that trigger  a need for external
regulation.  The  symbols  and  activities  are briefly  described  below,  and  discussed  in the  chapter  that follows.
0  Taking minor  deposits  (e.g.,  through  forced  savings  or mandatory  deposit  schemes)  may be permitted  under  an exemption
or exclusion  provision  in the general  banking  law  but  otherwise  require  no mandatory  extemal  regulaton.
O  Credit  unions  and savings  and  credit cooperatives  are  permitted  to take savings  and  fixed deposits  generally  frorn members
only, under  an exemption  or exclusion  provision  of the general  banking  law  and as registered  cooperative  societies. There  are
some cases of credit unions  or savings  and credit cooperatives  accepting  deposits  from non-members,  but limiting loans to
members  only.
© The license  and authorization  granted  by a bank  regulatory  authority  for  taking deposits  from the public  may  be limited  as to
instruments  (savings  and fixed deposits)  and to market  coverage  (region  or community  base),  or unlimited  as to instruments
(including  demand  deposits)  and to market  coverage  (nationwide).
®  Issuing  instruments  to generate  funds through  wholesale  deposit  substitutes  (commercial  paper, investment  placement
notes,  large-value  certificates  of deposit)  requires  registration  as a corporate  entity,  authorization  from a securities  & exchange
agency  and/or  bank  regulatory  authority.
% A bank  regulatory  authority  mandates  compliance  with minimum  levels  of capitalization  and capital  adequacy  (among  others)
as necessary  conditions  for initial  entry  and continued  operation  as an authorized  and licensed  banking  institution.
Importance  of  financial  statements  in  determining  the  extent  of  regulation
18.  The  usefulness  of  a risk-based  approach  to  financial  regulation  is  that  it  focuses  on  the  same  issues
that  good  managers  and  boards  of  directors  should  be  concerned  with  in  managing  a  MFI.  Aside  from
highlighting  the  central  role  of  institutional  capital,  this  approach  helps  in identifying  and  claritfing  those
risks  which  should  be  addressed  by  prudential  regulation  . This  approach  could  also  assist  in  designing
appropriate  regulatory  standards  that  recognize  fundamental  differences  in  the  structure  of  capital  and
risks  faced  by  MFIs,  as  discussed  in Chapter  III.
The  primary  differentiator  of  Category  A MFIs  which  depend  on other  peoples'  money  (Types  1-
3)  from  other  types  is  their  qualifying  capital  which  consists  substantially  of  donated  funds.  In
contrast,  the  qualifying  capital  of  Category  B MFIs  which  use  mostly  members'  money  (Type  4)
consists  mainly  of  members'  share  capital  contributions  and  institutional  reserves.  The  qualifying
capital  of  Category  C  MFIs  using  the  general  public's  money  (Types  5-7)  consists  of  equity
contributions  from  individual  shareholders.  Nonetheless,  most  MFIs  share  a common  di:fficulty  in
quickly  responding  to  a  capital  call  in  the  event  that  additional  equity  is  required.  Thus,  the
power  to  require  additional  capital  assumes  a  major  role  as  a  regulatory  instrument  for
supervisory  authorities.  However,  this  power  can  be  exercised  only  over  licensed  financial
institutions  and  not  on  unregulated  nonbank  MFIs.1O
*  The  other  important  difference  is  that  nonbank  MFIs  in  Categories  A  and  B  are  not  legally
permitted  to  mobilize  deposits  from  the  general  public,  a  liability-raising  activity  which  is
allowed  only  to Category  C MFIs.  This  restriction  has  a significant  impact  on  how  the  operations
and  assets  of  NGO  MFIs  are  financially  supported  by their  funders.
I0  This point was raised by Richard Rosenberg of CGAP in the first draft of this paper.
8The impact of fragmented  regulation  on MEls' institutional  development  and transformation
19. Banking  laws in many  countries  compartmentalize  and segment  markets and institutions,  constraining
MFI innovations and making their institutional development difficult. While the global experience
demonstrates the potential for operational growth of MFIs, the range of institutional channels is
segmented by  the  current legal  and regulatory environment in  most  countries.  The regulatory
environment  needs to be  changed in order to  transform the fragmented spectrum into a  cohesive
continuum which would make it  easier for MFIs to pursue a  process of progressive institutional
transformation.  This paper, however, does not make any proposal for MFIs to pursue plans for
institutional  transformation,  nor does it suggest any sequential  steps for development. Any decision to
transform,  evolve,  or maintain  a status  quo is dependent  on an MFI's strategic  plans for its future.
20. The percentage of non-profit NGO MFIs likely to reach critical mass in outreach and financial
viability is small. In turn, only when critical mass in outreach and financial viability are attained can
liabilities be safely raised from the public, through institutional transformation  into licensed formal
banking institutions subject to prudential  regulation.  In the few successful cases of transformation,  the
process has been characterized  by the NGO MFI and its promoters  becoming the founding  shareholders
for a subsidiary  institution  which then obtains  a license for banking  operations.  1
21. The environment  for integrating  MFIs into the formal financial system differs considerably  across
countries. It is emphasized  that no sequencing  or "stages  of development"  is implied  in the identification
and placement  of different categories  of MFIs in the continuum.  The vast majority of NGO MFIs will
remain as retail delivery  channels for  microfinance  programs  and a few may reach sustainability  without
ultimately  transforming  into a licensed bank. A properly  structured  regulatory  framework  could facilitate
organizational  development  and, where it is appropriate,  institutional  transformation.  SomeMFIs  may be
better off remaining  as low-leverage,  slow-growth  but effective  service  institutions  meeting  the needs of
their existing  clients. 12 The MSB sector  is not monolithic,  and experience  has shown  that the imposition
of regulatory standards  and procedures  where none are called for can only serve to constrict access of
MSBs to microfinance  services  from different  types of MFIs.
11  See "Introducing Savings in Microcredit Institutions: When and How", Focus Note No. 8, The World Bank, Consultative
Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP), April 1997 which is a synopsis of a paper by Marguerite Robinson, presented at the
annual meeting of the Microfinance Network, Manila, Philippines, November 1995.
12  Cuevas points out that entry into the regulated financial sector (through institutional transformation) depends on the nature
and extent of existing incentives and deterrents in the MFI environment and on the MFI's perceived potential and actual
ability to reach the market "niche" by becoming regulated.  See Carlos Cuevas, "Enabling Environment and Microfinance
Institutions: Lessons from Latin America", Joumal of Intemational Development, 8, March-April 1996.
9IH. Issues in Proposals  for Regulation  of MFIs
Is there a need to regulate  MFIs ?
22. Banking laws generally define "banking business" to consist of receiving funds from the public (by
accepting deposits or borrowing from the general public) and using such funds for loans and investments,
at the  risk  of the  institution  conducting  the  business.  Most countries  permit  deposit-taking  from the
general public to be carried out only by formally licensed financial institutions and restrict the use of the
name "bank" only to entities legally organized or licensed as such. In a number of countries, the business
of lending to the public (e.g., pawnbroking) is subject to prior registration with a supervisory authority.13
Nonbank MFIs with forced-deposits or mandatory savings schemes, however, do not provide bank-type
savings services since the deposits are tied to borrowers' loan contracts.  Involuntary savings schemes do
not permit a nonbank MFI to leverage its capital by accepting retail deposits from the community.
23. The power  to regulate  deposit-taking  from the public through licensing  provides  the platform  by
which  bank  regulatory  agencies  can then  supervise  the  other  operations  and  activities  of  regulated
institutions.  It is important  to consider whether or not the regulatory authorities have the institutional
capacity and staff resources for MFI supervision.  It is likewise important to consider the incremental
costs to MFIs  of having  the required  organizational, technical and staff resources  to comply  with the
reporting requirements and supervisory procedures. However, there are practical  difficulties in applying
the  guideline that the  benefits  of regulation  should exceed its  costs  -- particularly  in measuring  the
trade-offs.  Beyond  these  questions  of reporting  requirements,  regulatory  standards  and  supervisory
guidelines is the issue of which activities of MFIs should be regulated, by whom and in what form.
24. When  governments  establish  broad  regulations  over both  the  formal  banking  and  non-banking
sectors,  there  is  a  risk  of  imposing  regulatory  structures inappropriate  to  operations  of M]FIs. The
principal drawback to blanket regulation  of all MFIs  is the potential repression  of the innovation  and
flexibility possible with informality. Moreover, regulation by a government agency does not necessarily
correct  market  inefficiencies  in  discriminating  between  sustainable  and  non-viable  providers  of
microfinance  services.  This  kind  of  market-oriented  distinction  is  best  accomplished  through  the
operations of  market-based institutions such as licensed commercial banks doing business withMNIFIs,  or
through independent, credible credit-rating agencies.
What activities  and types of MFIs  should  be regulated?
25. Differences in the organizational  and operating  characteristics of the various types of MFIs  leave
them vulnerable to certain risks.  The risk-based approach to financial regulation  shows that while there
may be no major variances  in the structure of their assets, MFIs  are differentiated by  the structure of
their liabilities -- i.e., how their assets and operations are funded and the adequacy of qualifying capital in
leveraging additional resources to fund operations. It should be noted thiat  linking the wholesale  funding,
limited deposit-taking  and unrestricted deposit-taking  activities to the qualifying capital base  results  in
limits to the asset build-up that MFIs can prudently undertake, without having to instruct them on how to
carry  out their businesses.  The authorization to mobilize  funds from the public  in turn  carries related
requirements  to  comply  with prudential  standards and  guidelines on  certain asset-side  activities,  e.g.,
limits  on  concentration  in  loan  exposure  to  sectors, restrictions  on  insider  and  related-party  loans,
provisions for possible loan losses, etc.
13  For instance, in most of the transition economies in Eastem Europe, the ability of NGOs to extend loans is subject to prior
authorization from a government agency.
1026. The differences  in funding sources and the corresponding  risks that have to be managed trigger the
need for and type of  external  regulation. The assessment  of M[FIs'  financial  statements  and the results
of activities  which these statements  report on helps to identify  thresholdsat  which different categories  of
risk are being taken and different degrees  of regulation  which may be warranted. Taking a longer term
view, the framework  for banking  laws should  be structured  to provide  MFIs a clear view of the thresholds
to attain on the path to institutional  development  and transformation  -- even if not allMFIs choose to
follow that path.
27. This paper emphasizes  the fact that all parties concerned  benefit from a regulatory  framework  that is
transparent  and clearly  provides a continuum  where  MFIs can progressively  evolve into formal financial
institutions. In this context,  the proposed  model for a regulatory  framework  serves to identifythresholds
of financial  intermediation  activities  which would trigger a requirement  to satisfy  external or mandatory
regulatory guidelines.  As financial  institutions,  it would be prudent for all of the different  types ofMFIs
to observe internal or voluntary guidelines for risk management. Table 1 in the preceding section
identified  sample  thresholds in liability-generating  activities  which triggered a need for graduated forms
of regulation.  Table 2 below  accents the key features of the regulatory framework  model.  The table
identifies the fund generating activities that trigger a need for mandatory external guidelines and
summarizes  the proposed  regulatory  measures  and agencies  to carry  out them out.
Table 2. Regulatory  Thresholds  of Activities by Typce  of Microfinance  Institution
MFI Type  Activity  that  Determines  Proposed  Forn  of  External  Regulation,  Regulatory  Agency
Repula!to Status  lif  ulre
CATEGORY  A MFIs
Type  I  Making  microfinance  loans  not  in  excess  None  - Voluntary  registration  with  Self-  None,  or Self-Regulatory
Basic  Nonprofit  NGO  of grants  and  donated/concessional  Regulatory  Organization.  Organization.
funds.
Type  2  Taking  minor  deposits,  e.g.  forced  None  - Exemption  or exclusion  provision  of  Self-Regulatory
Nonprofit  NGO with  savings  or  mandatory  deposit  schemes,  banking  law;  compulsory  registration  with  Self  Organization.
limited  deposit-taking from  microfinance  clients  in  community.  Regulatory  Organization.
Type  3  Issuing  instruments  to  generate  funds  Registration  as  a corporate  legal  entity;  Companies'  registry
NGO  transformed  into  through  wholesale  deposit  substitutes  authorization  frorm  securities  & exchange  agency;  Securities  &
Incorporated  MFI  (commercial  paper,  large-value  agency,  with  limitations  on  size,  term  and  Exchange  agency.
certificates  of  deposit,  investment  tradability  of  commercial  paper  instruments.
placement  notes)
CATEGORY  B MFIs
Type  4  Operating  as  closed-  or  open-common  Notification  to  and  registration  with  Cooperatives  Authority,  or
Credit  Union,  Savings  bond  credit  union  or savings  & credit  Cooperatives  Autlority  or  Bank  Supervisory  Bank  Supervisory  Agency
& Credit  Cooperative  cooperative  society;  deposit-taking  from  Authority;  or  certification  and  rating  by  a  or  Credit  Rating  Entity.
Society  member-clients  in  the  community,  private  independent  credit  rating  agency.
workplace  or  trade.
CATEGORY  C  MFIs  _ _  _____,_7_  _
Type  5  Taking  limited  deposits  (e.g.  savings  &  Registration  and  licensing  by  Bank  Bank  Supervisory
Specialized  Bank,  fixed  deposits)  from  general  public  Supervisory  Authority,  with a limitation  Authority.
Deposit-taking  beyond  minor  deposits  exemption  in  provision  (e.g.,  savings  &  fixed  deposits,
Institution,  or  banking  law.  Microfinance  activities  more  smaller  deposits/capital  multiple,  higher
Finance  Company  extensive  than  NGOs  but  operations  not  liquidity  reserves,  limits  on  asset  activities  and
on  scale  of  licensed  banks.  uses).
Type  6  Non-restricted  deposit-taking  activities,  Registration  and  lull  licensing  by  Bank  Bank  Supervisory
Licensed  Mutual-  including  generating  funds  through  Supervisory  Authority  as  a mutual-ownership  Authority.
Ownership  Bank  commercial  paper  and  large-value  or  equity  bank;  compliance  with  capitalization
Type  7  deposit-substitutes,  from  the  general  / capital  adequacy  requirements,  loan  loss
Licensed  Equity  Bank  public,  investors  and  other  banks.  provisioning  and  full  prudential  regulations.
1128. Basic considerations
a)  No external regulation should be required for Types 1 and 2 MFIs and those entities in the
informal MFI sector such as rotating savings and credit associations  (ROSCAs),  club pools and
village banks which are informally organized. Donors, government  agencies and conmmercial
banks from which their funds are sourced may be presumed to have the capability for due
diligence and make informed decisions about them -- a form of regulation through,  market
selection.
b)  A standard registration  requirement which covers documents  of establishment  and governance
structure  should apply  to MFIs in Types 3 through  7 in the same manner  that other businiess  and
social organizations  are required  to register.  It is not necessary  to design and establish  a separate
structure of regulatory standards and procedures for MFIs because existing guidelines for
prudential  regulation  can  be adapted  to accommodate  MFIs.
c)  Banking laws govern the mobilization  of deposits from the public, but can also address the
mobilization  of other types of resources to accommodate  the financing and investing needs of
other sectors, principally by means of non-deposit  financial securities and instruments.  The
banking laws in a number of countries provide a definition of "public" as persons beyond a
specified  number who are not related to each other by law or association.  Banking laws should
apply only to voluntary  deposits and should not cover forced savings or mandatory deposit
schemes  which are specifically  tied to loan contracts.
d)  Banks and other regulated institutions in the formal sector mobilize non-deposit  funds through
capital market activities such as wholesale  deposits,  commercial  paper issues andsecuritization.
Subject to well-defined  requirements  and procedures  under the banking and securities laws, it
should be feasible to allow  MFIs similar (but restricted)  mobilization  of non-deposit  funds. In  a
number of countries where institutions can raise funds in the capital markets, an independent
credit rating  agency performs an  indispensable market-based regulatory role. No  special
treatment or exemptions  from eligibility  or registration  requirements  should be accordedMFIs
which plan to mobilize wholesale  funds,  and MFIs should  satisfy the same standards  required of
other  institutions  that raise funds  in the wholesale  and capital  markets. 14
29. Regulatory  thresholds
a)  NGO MFIs that begin to resort to fund mobilization  through wholesale deposits or deposit-
substitutes  (as in Type 3) should satisfy securities  registration  requirements  of the securities and
exchange agency. Issuers of wholesale-type  financial instruments such as commercial paper
securities and investment  participation  certificates  have to satisfy certain  minimum  requirements
with respect  to their financial  standing  and ability  to service  the placement  or investment.
14  Timothy Lyman (Day, Berry & Howard LLP) points out that  in countries  without an effectively  functioning  securities
regulatory  system,  MFIs  that do not take deposits  from the public can still place the general  public at unregulated  risk
through  debt securities. This is especially  true in countries  (e.g.,  the transition  economies)  where  the legal and economic
systems  have not developed clear distinctions  between debt and equity, or among different types of securities, or
determined  the most effective  forms of regulating  them.
12b)  Limited deposit-taking  in the form of forced savings  or mandatory  deposits  which are tied to loan
contracts by Types 2, 3 and 4 MFIs should simply be authorized under an exemption or exclusion
notice  under the general banking law (similar to the approach developed in  South Africa,
described in the Appendix) without need for a  specific license. The approach allows for a
universal application of banking law on deposit-taking  activities and serves to  unify,  in the
central  monetary  authority,  regulatory  jurisdiction  over financial  matters.
c)  Compared  to closed-common  bond societies,  deposit-taking  by open-common  bond savings and
credit cooperatives  or credit unions (Type  4) could be riskier and deserves  closer attention. The
former limits membership  to a clearly defined group of persons and generally have a limited
scale of operation  in terms of geography  and size of client/membership  base. On the other  hand,
open-common  bond credit unions draw their membership  from a geographic area rather than a
specifically defined group and tend to be larger in scope of operations and deposit volume.
However,  the closed-  vis-a-vis  open-common  bond distinction  is somewhat  limited. For instance,
the distinction needs to be modified  to take into account the divergent and competing  objectives
of owner-borrowers  and owner-savers,  in any consideration  of regulations  over the deposit-taking
activities  of member-based  organizations.  15
d)  A Type 5 MFI operates  as a non-bank  intermediary,  finarncing  company,  or specialized  or limited
bank. Its limited license may permit deposit-taking  activities from the general public, generally
to an amount  limited  to a multiple  of its total qualifying  capital  and excluding  the ability  to create
demand deposits,  with operations  limited to a defined area. What distinguishes  it fromMFIs in
Types 6 and 7 is that it is subject  to assets-side  restrictions  and the deposits it can accept  may be
limited to savings and fixed deposits. However,  a Type 5 MFIs will still have to comply with
capital adequacy guidelines, albeit at lower leverage multiples while limits on services and
operations  apply.  Deposits  mobilized  should  be covered by liquidity  reserves in the form of pre-
determined  levels of deposits with the banking system or investments  in government  securities.
While the liquidity  reserve requirement  might be steeper  than those for Types 6 and 7 MFIs the
authority to  engage in limited deposit-taking  activity allows the MFI to gain experience in
managing  liquidity  risks and deposit  mobilization  programs.
e)  Types 6 and 7 MFIs, registered as mutual-ownership  or equity-share banks are permitted to
mobilize  deposits from the general  public and create  demand  deposits  through checking  accounts.
They are subject to licensing  requirements  and full reguL]ation  and supervision  by the regulatory
authorities,  particularly their compliance  with and observance  of capital adequacy,  risk-asset
classification  and leverage,  loan  classification  and provisioning  standards,  concentration  of loans
and deposits  and deposit  insurance  enrollment.
Who should regulate MFIs?  - monitoring regulatory triggers
30. There are two  approaches to  regulation of  MFI operations:  (i) internal  regulation  through
governance and  (ii) external  regulation  by  a  supervisory agency. For regulated MFIs these two
approaches  are closely  related since the effectiveness  of the second approach  is highly dependent  on the
first. However,  observance  of sound risk management  guidelines  through  internal  regulation  is absolutely
15  See Rodrigo A. Chaves and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "Principles of Regulation and Supervision: Should They be Different
for  Microenterprise  Finance  Organizations?",  Occasional  Paper  No.  1979,  Rural  Finance  Program,  Ohio  State
University, September 1992.
13indispensable,  whether  or not a MFI is subject  to external  regulation. Boards  of Directors,  who  represent
the shareholders,  members or donors, have the ultimate responsibility  and accountability for internal
oversight  and governance  over management  in a MFI's operations.
31. The approaches  to external supervision  of MFIs can range from nonexistent  to full regulation,  either
through the  existing prudential regulatory framework or  by  modifying the  existing regulatory
requirements  to fit the organizational  and operating  characteristics  of MFIs. A primary example of the
adaptive  approach  is "tiered  banking"  and graduated  regulation  - a structure  which takes into account  the
defining  characteristics  of the microfinance  business  and the varied  range of MFIs involved  in it. 16  In a
"tiered banking" structure, a range of financial intermediaries  is licensed by the regulatory banking
authority  to provide  banking and financial  services  to the public. The licenses  granted specify limits to
the types of services  that may be offered,  as well as the prudential  guidelines  to be observed.  Small,
specialized  or limited  banks coexist with large universal  or multiple  banks in a "tiered banking"  structure
which remains  under the  jurisdiction  of the regulatory  bank authority.
31.  A second major example  is the adaptation,  based on the experience  in capital  markets, which uses a
credit rating agency for market-based  regulation.  While a credit-rating agency (e.g., Moody's or
Standard  and Poor) does not have statutory  authority over rated institutions,  it can exercise significant
regulatory power if  investors and lenders respect its independence and credibility.  An interesting
initiative  is being taken in Guatemala  by a group of leading  Guatemalan  credit unions,  with the assistance
of the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU)  and the Consultative  Group to Assist the Poorest
(CGAP), to  establish a privately-funded  and autonomously-managed  credit rating and certification
agency  for credit unions. 17
33. A working partnership among "fit  and proper" key players in  financial risk management is
fundamental  to a functioning  regulatory  framework  even though  the responsibilities,  accountabilities  and
interests  of the key players are different. The approach  proposed  in this paper provides a framewvork  for
identifying  and allocating  tasks to seven  key players  who are accountable  for different componerLts  of the
risk management  process. Table 3 below summarizes  the partnership,  whose priority task is to clearly
define accountability and  install infornation  and  surveillance systems to  track compliance with
established  policies,  procedures  and programs.  18
Internal  regulation  and governance
34. Governance  can be viewed  as a framework  of checks  and balances  designed  to ensure  that no party or
parties within an MFI impede  the attainment  of corporate  objectives  by diverting  its resources for private
gain. Effective  governance  depends on a carefully  designed  system  which links shareholders/  members!
donors to the board of directors or trustees, to executive management,  the staff and clients, and the
16  The regulatory approach through "tiered banking" and graduated regulation in Ghana, Uganda and Zambia is discussed in
detail by William F. Steel in several World Bank internal memoranda. See also David Porteous, "Tears for the Unbanked
/ Tiers for the Unbanked", a paper presented at the South African Reserve Bank Seminar on Informal Financing, August
7,  1996.
17  World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU), "Guatemala: Private Sector Credit Union Rating and Certification Program", a
Proposal to CGAP by WOCCU, Madison, WI: WOCCU, December 15, 1997.
18 In Bank Governance Contracts:  Establishing Goals and Accountability in Bank Restructuring, World Bank Discussion Paper
No. 308, World Bank: Washington, DC, 1995 Richard Roulier presents an innovative model -- a governance contract --
for instituting bank governance and assuring that owners understand their responsibilities, delegate those responsibilities
to properly constituted governing boards, and establish proper relationships with government regulatory agencies.
14general public. The linkages  among  the key players become increasingly  important  because  MFIs are an
integral  part of the total financial  system.
35. Shareholders  or members  are responsible  for appointing  the board of directors  or trustees,  officers in
executive  management,  the audit committee  and external  auditors,  and ultimately  determine  the direction
and business of an institution. MFIs are different from nonfinancial  companies  in that the loyalties of
management  and the board should  be not only to shareholders  and/or  donors,  but also to  depositors and
other sources of funds who provide the leverage  to institutional  capital. Depositors are different from
normal trade creditors  because the acceptance  of funds  from depositors  carries a fiduciary responsibility
which is different  from the obligation  under a commercial  borrowing.
Table  3. Risk  Management  Partnership  among  Key  Players
Key  players  Accountability
1.  Shareholders  Responsible  for  appointing  good  and  competent  directors
2.  Board  of  directors  Set  policy  and  appoint  good  and  competent  management
3.  Management  Carry  out  the  business  in  accordance  with  established  policy
4.  Audit  committee  I intemal  audit  Test  compliance  with  policy
5.  Extemal  auditors  Express  opinion  and  evaluate  risk  management  policies
6.  Outside  stakeholders:  The  Public  Understand  responsibility  and insist  on  proper  disclosure
Donors  and  creditors  Assess  financial  standing,  operating  results,  quality  of
Investors  I depositors  I clients  Responsible  for  own  decisions
Analysts  Analyze  MFI  arid  advise  investors,  creditors  and  donors
Credit  rating  agencies  Carry  out  fair  and  impartial  rating  and  point  out  downside  risks
Media  Inform  the  public
7.  Regulators  Create  regulatory  framework  to  optimize  risk  management
36. Unlike a cooperative society or licensed specialized  bank, Category A MFIs manage and dispose
funds donated  by persons, institutions  and government  agencies  to benefit certain segments  of the public
for purposes that are usually adequately  defined. On the other hand, a savings and credit cooperative
society manages and  invests funds contributed by  members, while Category C MFIs --  licensed
specialized  banks, deposit-taking  institutions  or regular  banks manage and invest funds  solicited  from the
general  public. In all cases the directors,  officers  and managers  of the MFI carry a trustee's responsibility
with respect to the funds they manage and invest. A key guideline  for self-regulation  through internal
governance is that key financial  indicators for  risk-management should be set at ranges of values more
conservative than the limits permitted under prudential guidelines set by bank regulatory authorities.
37. An organized entity generally  adopts a code of conduct or ethical behavior that is expected to be
observed  by directors, officers  and staff. The code covers their activities and behavior in the course of
conducting the organization's business, representing it in transactions or functions and in carrying out the
duties and responsibilities assigned to various individuals.  This is particularly important for Category A
and B MFIs  because the adoption and enforcement of a clear code of conduct sends a strong signal to
donors, clients, the government and the general public that the institution maintains high  standards.  In
addition, the code of conduct can be an effective way of enhancing integrity and dedication among staff,
which is indispensable for success in a self-help organization.
1538. Since most  MFIs  start out originally as NGOs, their ownership and organizational  structure may be
unclear and  not geared  for board  supervision of management.  Moreover, the founding  investors  who
provide  the  initial  capital  for  such MFIs  (e.g.,  NGOs,  international  and  local  donors,  government
agencies) may have neither the financial depth nor the operative willingness to respond quickly to calls
for additional capital if and when the need for fresh funding arises.
39. The board  oversees MFI  operations  and bears ultimate responsibility  to  shareholders,  donors  and
depositors for its solvency.  This requires that adequate risk management policies and procedures  are in
place. Governance exercised by the board enhances institutional survival and moves an institution beyond
dependence  on its founding visionary.19 On the other hand, the board can also push an MFI towards
imprudent  growth  and  financial  crisis,  as  documented  by  the  experience  of FinanSol/CorpoSol  in
Colombia.20 The recent experience of Bankin Raya Karara (BRK) in Niger illustrates the consequences
of inadequate controls and oversight by the board of directors over executive management.
40. For the board of directors of any financial institution including MFIs, the fundamental responsibilities
with respect to governance cover four areas:
a)  A fiduciary  responsibility  to  ensure the financial integrity  and  soundness of the MFI  and
safeguard the interests of all of its stakeholders;
b)  A strategic  role in designing corporate strategy by considering the principal risks  faced by
the institution, and reviewing and approving the business plans formulated by management in
the context of the MFI's  mission;
c)  A  supervisory function  in delegating to management  appropriate operating  authorities  and
approval limits, and supervising its execution of the business plan; and
d)  A management development responsibility for selection, evaluation and compensation of the
senior management team, including succession planning for the MFI's  chief executive and
other key officers.
41.  Thus, the risk management process through internal governance is a joint responsibility  of executive
management together with the board and its audit committee and internal auditors.  External auditors can
complement  and  strengthen  the internal  risk  management processes  through  audit  programs  that  are
oriented  yo  risk  analysis and  assessment, rather  than  limited to  traditional balance  sheet  and  income
statement audit  examinations.  For MFIs that are subject to prudential supervision, external auditors can
assist significantly  in optimizing the external risk management process through proper coordination and
liaison with supervision examiners and internal auditors.
External regulation and prudential supervision
42. Sectoral and industry associations  are generally  formed  for advocacy  purposes. However,  they can
also assist  in and carry out many forms of self-regulation, in order to pre-empt  or reduce  government
intervention.  There are umbrella groups  for NGO MFIs which  have been  formed within a  country or
region  for  the  purpose  of  sharing  good  practice  techniques,  elevating  the  quality  of  internal  self-
regulation  and board  supervision, and disseminating standards and measures  for improved management
19  Max  Clarkson  and  Michael  Deck,  "Effective  Governance  for  Microfinance  Institutions",  a  paper for  the  4th  annual
MicroFinance Network Conference, Establishing a Microfinance Industry, Niagara-on-the-Lake, Canada, November 1996.
20  See Jean Steege, "The Rise and Fall of Corposol: Lessons Learned from the Challenges of Managing  Growth",  LJSAID,
Microenterprise Best Practices Project, Washington DC, October 1998.
16and operations. 2 1 However,  self-regulation  through an umbrella  organization  can be effective only if the
majority  of the institutions  are under its jurisdiction  and if sanctions  for non-compliance  can be enforced.
These two conditions  are seldom  met.
43. The vast majority  of semi-formal  and formal  MFIs (excluding  the informal  MFIs such as ROSCAS,
stokvels,  village banks and savings clubs) are non-profit  NGOs. Only a handful  of microfinance  NGOs
have developed sufficiently to transform into licensed banks or financial institutions. The financial
dynamics and risk characteristics  of MFI operations  differ from those of formal banking institutions  in
several  ways:
*  MFIs' loan delinquency  rates can be much more volatile,  even though some well-run  MFIs have
achieved  loan delinquency  rates comparable  to or lower than those for regulated  banks.
*  MFIs operate with  higher administrative and  operating costs and  financial spreads than
commercial  banks.  Thus, a given level of loan delinquency  is likely to impact an MFI's cash
flows  more adversely  than a commercial  bank's.
*  Most MFIs have limited capacity than regular commercial  banks to increase their capitalization
levels quickly because most MFIs are capitalized by grants from governments,  donors and
international  agencies,  or by individuals  and associations  with limited  wealth rather than  by easily
identifiable,  clearly  solvent  individual  private investors.
*  Many of the business  and operating  risks that  MFIs confront  are rooted in several  features  unique
to microfinance:
(i) access to financial services  from organized  MFIs is a relatively  new and untested experience
for microenterprises  which avail of financing  from informal  moneylenders,
(ii) most MFIs are new institutions  whose operations  are often perceived as no different from
those of charitable,  welfare-oriented  agencies,
(iii) few professionals  and technicians  with prior banking  operations  experience  are familiar with
MFI operations  and methodologies,  and
(iv) the growth  in operations  and high visibility  ofMFIs, especially  those in Category  A, is often
dependent  on the continued  commitment  and contribution  of charismatic  leadership.
44. These differences  can be overcome  by adopting  a fundamentazl  framework  for prudential  regulation
currently applicable to regulated commercial  banks and by making modifications  appropriate  to MFIs
through "tiered banking"  and graduated  regulation. Regulatory  parameters  should  be structured  such that
benefits from regulation  exceed  its costs, not only for the  MFIs but also for the regulators and the public
that is served. While the empirical measurement  and determination  of net benefits may be difficult,  it is
in this manner that the overall regulatory framework  could be evolved so that the environment  under
which MFIs operate supports  an orderly  process of institutional  development  and transformation.
45. Bank supervisors,  deposit insurance companies and securities regulators become involved in the
external risk  management process for regulated MFIs because of  the compelling interest of  the
government  in the soundness  and stability  of the banking and financial  system for the sake of the rest of
the economy. However, it needs to be clearly understood that (i) external supervisors  and regulators
21  In Kenya, the NGO Act of  1990 created an NGO Council composed of the first  100 NGOs registered under the Law.  The
Council is tasked with developing codes of conduct to regulate activities of NGOs in various fields, which are subject to
approval by the Non-Governmental Organizations Coordination Board.  See The International Center for Not-for-Profit
Law, Handbook  on Good Practices  for Laws  relating  to Non-Governmental  Organizations,  The World  Bank:  Washington,
DC, May 1997 (Discussion draft).
17cannot prevent regulated and licensed institutions from failing and  (ii) as  facilitators of  the risk
management process supervisors and regulators must evaluate and enhance the statutory framework
under which risk management  is carried out by regulated  and supervised  MFIs.
Sanctions
46. Requirements for proper reporting have to be backed up by appropriate sanctions  and penalties for
non-compliance.  The non-submission of reports renders it difficult, if not impossible, for registration and
supervisory agencies to determine whether or not an entity still exists and is in operation.  Two principles
to follow are (i) the  punitive consequences should be commensurate to the degree of non-compliance and
(ii) the basis for sanctions and penalties should be standard for institutions and non-discriminatory.
47. For example, the sanctions imposed by bank supervisors on licensed MFIs and financial  institutions
increases  in the  severity of penalties as non-compliance  escalates or is repeated.  Membership-based
cooperative societies are obligated to observe the rules and guidelines promulgated by a comniissioner  of
cooperatives. Incorporated NGO MFIs should observe the same requirements that apply to registered for-
profit institutions, which  are required to prepare and submit to a registration agency a set of externally-
audited financial statements and annual report of operations.  It should be noted. however, thalt  the degree
of compliance by registered entities with even this minimal set of requirements is generally uneven and it
is unclear that the regulatory agencies  have the  resources and staff to process  these  required reports.
48.'An important issue is the nature and format of guidelines that would be required and may be
appropriate for suspending, canceling or revoking an MFI's  basis for legitimate operation in those cases
where  it cannot perform  up to acceptable  standards.  In a few cases,  an MFI might  voluntarily  seek
termination.  Such  acceptable  standards constitute  the basis  on  which  an authorization  or license  for
microfinance  activities has been  granted.  The two major issues that need  to be addressed  are (i) the
definition of performance and operating standards, and (ii) the appropriate procedures to be o'bserved for
situations that merit mandatory suspension of operations or termination of existence of an MFI.
18IV.  Basic Considerations  in Risk Managemnent
Fundamental  considerations
Risk-management  rather  than ratio-management
49. There is a tendency for regulators and financial analysts to focus on observance of prudential ratios
which leads to an emphasis  on ratio management, rather than on the basic processes of managing risk.
While  ratios are useful  tools for risk monitoring and management, undue  emphasis  on financial ratios
could result  in  problems  because  non-routine  and' non-auditable risks  comprise  a  bigger threat  than
routine risks which can be subjected to audit tests and procedures. Risk control systems will not prevent
failure  at the management  level and may  not properly address  the causes of  failures in  the decision-
making processes.
50. Contrary to  the preoccupation  with  ratio-management,  the  proper  approach  to  risk  management
should instead focus on the following areas:
*  On  routine risk  which  can be  minimized and  even  eliminated through standardized policies  and
procedures and controlled through an internal audit and control system to identify infractions of limits of
authority, approved procedure, etc.;
e  On the top level of management itself, with respect to the corrmposition  of the management team and its
members' personal risk profile in terms of knowledge, experiernce,  skills, risk attitudes;
- On management's  decision-making processes,  especially the interaction among the members  of the
decision-making team  and the factors that influence their decisions; and
*  On risk management as a dynamic and continuing process of assessment, rather than one of generating
and supplying the financial data and ratios reflected in the current balance sheet or income statement.
Risks  that have  to be managed  by financial  intermediaries  including  MIs
51. The  majority  of MFIs  are  simple  financial  institutions  which  are  not  likely  to  be  involved  in
sophisticated  instruments  and risks.  Nonetheless, they  are exposed  to a number  of the financial  and
operational  risks  faced  by  financial  intermediaries.  Some risks which  can result in  a defined  loss are
regarded as "pure" risks, namely: (i) operational risk, (ii) credit risk and (iii) liquidity risk.  On the other
hand, "speculative"  risks which  can result  in either a profit or a loss include  (i) interest rate risk,  (ii)
market (price/investment) risk and (iii) currency risk. Operational risks arising from  (i) fraud, (ii) error,
and  (iii)  systems  problems  are  especially  important  in  MF1[ operations  because  of  their  internal
governance structure.  The major categories of risk faced by finanacial  intermediaries, includingMFIs, are
summarized in Table 4 below.
19Table 4 - Major Categories of Risk
1. Balance  sheet  structure  *  past  and future  risks  resulting  from  intended  or unintended  changes  in the size,  structure  and
composition  of the  balance  sheet.
2. Profitability  structure  *  risks  resulting  from  changes  in the  composition  of  various  sources  of income  and expense
categories  which  affect  the efficiency  of the  institution.
3. Capital  adequacy  / solvency  a  the  risk that  the institution  will have  insufficient  capital  to continue  operating,  at its average  risk-
weighted  asset  profile,  as  well as  the risk  of non-compliance  with intemally  set or extemally
prescribed  minimum  capital  standards.
4. Credit  risk  a  the  risk that a counterparty  (including  a sovereign  counterparty)  to a credit  agreement  will not
be able  or willing  to  service  the interest  or repay  the principal.
5. Treasury  risk:
Liquidity  risk  *  the  risk that  the institution  has  insufficient  funds  on hand  to meet  its obligations.  This risk
includes  concentration  of large  depositors/funders,  reliance  on volatile  deposits/funds,  and the
currency  structure  of deposits/funds.
Interest  rate  risk  *  the  risk of an adverse  flow  of income  and expenses  and the  ultimate  diminution  in the
institution's  net  equity  as the  result  of adverse  changes  in interest  rates.
Market  risk  *  the  risk of capital  gain or loss resulting  from  investments  in commodity,  fixed interest,  equity  or
currency  markets.
Currency  risk  *  the  risk of changes  in exchange  rates  having  a negative  impact  on foreign  receivables  and
foreign  payables,  when  the institution  has  foreign  currency-denominated  balance  sheet items.
6. Operational  risk  *  the  risk from  non-financial  areas  such  as accounting,  electronic  data  processing  (EDF'),  loss of
market  share,  employee  relations,  or physical  events  causing  a financial  loss or stoppage  in
operations.
Allocation  and  sharing  of  risk  management  responsibilities
52.  There  is  complementarity  in  the  responsibilities  for  risk  management  --  voluntary  regulation  through
internal  governance  vis-a-vis  mandatory  regulation  through  external  supervision.  Even  though  most  types
of  MFIs  are  outside  the  scope  of  jurisdiction  of  regulatory  authorities,  the  adoption  and  observance  by
non-regulated MFIs of risk management principles and practices upon which prudential regulations  are
based can lead to a better-performing microfinance market.
53. Regulators ensure prudent risk management by prescribing risk-based capital adequacy requirements
for  supervised intermediaries.  By  specifying the limits to the relationship between  risk assets  and the
amount of qualifying capital adequate to safeguard solvency and liquidity, they determine the overall size
of risk-oriented business and deposit-based funding that a regulated institution can carry out. In addition,
regulators  in many countries determine the extent of branch operations, limits of exposure to any single
borrower or investment or industrial sector that the regulated institution is permitted.  Prescribing how a
regulated  institution  should conduct its business will serve to jeopardize  its operational  flexibility  and
innovation.  Instead  of such  a misplaced  focus, regulators  should  insist on  documented  evidence of
application of acceptable risk management procedures.
Application of risk management principles
54. The  financial  risks  to  be  managed  internally  through  governance  and  regulated  externally  by
supervisory authorities  can be  evaluated according to  a number of analytical  formats.  The traditional
CAMEL methodology (capital, asset quality, management quality, earnings and liquidity) for evaluating
risk position of financial institutions was created as a supervisory tool, rather than as a management tool.
A major focus of the CAMEL ratios is measurement of acceptable levels of solvency of an institution and
the safety of deposits.  On the other hand, the system of monitoring and evaluation indicators for credit
unions known as PEARLS (protection, earnings, asset quality, rates of return and cost, liquidity and signs
20of growth) was developed first as  a management tool and later became an effective supervisory
mechanism. 22 PEARLS  results in objective  measurements,  whereas  the CAMEL  approach  involves  some
degree of subjective judgment by  analysts or  examiners particularly on  management quality and
capability. In addition, private commercial  banks have developed  their own financial  monitoring and
evaluation  systems  which isolate and measure  different  categories  of risks.
55. The main thrust of this paper is to promote a standard  application of risk management principles
which would be useful to an institution's  management  and its governing  board or trustees,  shareholders  or
members, external auditors, the regulatory authorities,  institutional creditors, donors and the general
public.23 This paper  emphasizes  that  the responsibility for  risk  management  rests principally  on
voluntary regulation  through  internal governance,  rather than on  external  supervision  by regulatory
authorities. Risk-based  financial  regulation  should  identify and specify  the following  aspects:
a)  The particular  risks that are most relevant  to MFIs,
b)  For each  relevant  risk, the key indicators  that are most important  for risk management  in MFI
operations,
c)  The ranges of values and their trends over time which would be useful to directors and
managers  responsible  for internal  governance  in monitoring  the financial  health ofMFIs that
they manage,  and
d)  The ranges of values and their trends over time which would be invaluable in establishing
regulatory guidelines  to be used by external supervisors  who have the mandate to regulate
MFIs under their  jurisdiction.
56. Table 5 (together  with its accompanying  Notes) in the pages that follow summarizes  the categories  of
risk and range of values of financial risk indicators  for the three broad classes of MFIs in this paper's
regulatory framework  model. Table 5 highlights  (i) the observed  value ranges of selected  financial risk
indicators,  (ii) recommended  value ranges suitable for consideration  in internal govemance  and, where
appropriate  or warranted,  (iii) suggested  threshold  values  with respect to external  regulation  for each of
the three categories  of MFIs. The recommended  and threshold  values are neither absolute nor arbitrary,
and it is emphasized  that practical applications  should  take into account  specific country  conditions.
57. This paper has used values of certain indicators of financial and operating performance of MFIs
which were readily available from published  work, simply  for the purpose of  illustrating  the application
of risk management  principles discussed  in this paper to differernt  types of  MFIs. The basis for selecting
the MFIs whose financial indicator  values are being used for illustrative  purposes  was the closeness  by
which  they  approximated  the  conceptual  types  of MFIs  in  the  continuum  discussed  in  this  paper.
However, no claim is being made that the MFIs selected  confoirm  strictly to the characteristics  of each
type of MFI in the continuum,  and neither is it the intention  to "force"  these MFIs into any classifications.
For illustrative  purposes,  the values  of key indicators  derived  from the 1993  USAID-sponsored  survey of
eleven successful  microfinance  programs, the database developed  by the Microfinance  Program of the
22 David C. Richardson, "PEARLS  - Financial  Stabilization Monitoring  andl Evaluation",  World Council of  Credit Unions
Research Monograph Series, No. 4, August 1997 edition (processed).
23 A detailed discussion of financial performance and risk management indicators for banking institutions can be seen in (i) Jan
Hendrik  Van Greuning,  "The  Implementation of  a Risk-Based Approach  to Bank  Supervision as  a Micro-Economic
Component of Monetary Policy", unpublished doctoral dissertation, Pretoria, South Africa: University of Pretoria,  1993;
(ii) Chris Baltrop and Diana McNaughton, Banking Institutions in Developing Markets: Interpreting Financial Statements,
vol. 2, Washington,  DC: The World Bank,  1992 (1996) and (iii) for MIFIs in particular,  the CGAP Appraisal Format,
which is described in Chapter 5 of the CGAP/SBP Microfinance Practical Guide (1997).
21Table 5. Key  Risk Management  Factors  and Indicators
i  l  _  Catezgory  A  |Category  B  Category  C
MFIs  Using  Other  Peoples'  money:  MFIs  Using  Members'  Money:  MFIs Using  the Public's  Money:
Non-Profit  NGOs,  Credit  Unions;  Specialized/Limited  Equity Banks;
NGOs  and MFIs  with  Limited  Deposit  Taking  Savings  & Credit Cooperatives  Licensed Mutual-Ownership  Banks
____________  ._____.  _  .___  Non-Bank Financial Institutions
Range  of  Suggested  Suggested  Range  of  Suggested  Suggested  Range  of  Suggested  Suggested
Risk  Management  Factors  Observed  Thresholds  Guidelines  for  Observed  Thresholds  Guidelines  Observed  Thresholds  Guidelines  for
and Indicators  Values  for Internal  External  Self-  Values  for Internal  for External  Values  for Internal  External
Governance  Regulatory  Governance  Regulation  Governance  Regulation  /
Sody$  rvso
1. Balance  Sheet  Structure
Earning  assets:
Loans  as % of ave.  assets  55-75%  65-70%  65-70%  60-70%  70-80%  70-80%  65-80%  70-80%  none  required
Non-performing  loans  as %  2-10%  < 5%  5-10%  7-10%  < 5%  < 5%  1.5-6.5%  < 5%  5-10%
of total loan portfolio
Non-earning  assets:
Fixed  assets  as % of  not available  ￿  5 %  none  required  20-25%  ￿  5%  5-10%  not available  ￿  20%  ￿  25%
capital
Funding  liabilities  as %
of total  capital:
Wholesale  deposits  not available  < 100%  ￿  100  %  1-3%  0%  0%  not available  s 150%  150%
& borrowings
Retail  public or members'  not  available  < 100%  < 100%  145-180%  Ž 250%  250 %  not available  ￿  300%  300%
deposits
II. Capital  Adequacy
Risk-weighted  assets  : capital  1.5-3  X  ￿3X  3 X  2.5-3.5  X  ￿4X  3-5  X  5-20 X  ￿  5-6.5  X  6-8 X
Total  liabilities  : capital  not  available  not available  2 X  2-3 X  < 3.5 X  3.5 X  not available  < 8 X  <8 X
% of current  earnings  retained  not  available build up capital  build up capital  not available build up capital build up Cap.  not available  build up Res.  build up Res.
Institutional  capital  / required  not available |  100%  > 100%  not available  not applicable not  applicable not available  > 100%  |  100%
minimum  capital  -
Ill.  Liquidity  Risk
10 largest  depositors  /funders  not available  ￿  25%  none  required  not applicable not applicable not applicable not available  s 10%  none  required
as % of total deposits/funds  I_I  I
Volatile funds  as % of  not available  0  none  required  0%  0%  0%  not available  s 10%  none  required
total deposits/borrowings  _  _  ____I_I_I_i_i_  I
Cash  + deposits  + short-term  not available  25%  j  25%  I  10%  j  10-15%  20%  j not available  25%  |  20%
investments  as % of deposits/  I  I  i  I  I  I  i  I  .
bborrowings_  _  _  _  _  _  _I  _[  _I  _[_I[,1  _I
22Table  5. Key Risk  Management  Factors  and Indicators  (Continued)
-:  Category  A  Category  B  Category  C
a  >  X  sg  MFls  Using  Other  Peoples'  money:  MFIs  Using  Members'  Money:  MFIs Using  the Public's  Money:
Non-Profit  NGOs,  Credit  Unions;  Specialized/Limited  Equity B3anks;
NGOs  and MFIs  with Limited  Deposit  Taking,  Savings  & Credit Cooperatives  Licensed Mutual-Ownership  Banks
____________  ______________ _____________  ~~Non-Bank  Financial  Institutions
Range  of  Suggested  Suggested  Range  of  Suggested  Suggested  Range  of  Suggested  Suggested
Risk  Management  Factors  Observed  Thresholds  Guidelines  for  Observed  Thresholds  Guidelines  for  Observed  Thresholds  Guidelines  for
and Indicators  Values  for Internal  External  Self-  Values  for Intemal  External  Values  for Internal  External
Governance  Regulatory  Governance  Regulation  Governance  Regulation  I
IV. Income  StatementBo  Suevsn
Structure
Effective  yield  on loan  portfolio  30-45%  Ž  market  none  required  19-25%  Ž  market  none  required  28-45%  Ž market  none  required
Net interest  margin  as % of  10-25%  Ž 18%  none  required  10-15%  Ž 15%  none  required  12-20%  Ž 12%  none  required
average assets
Unadjusted  return  on ave.  3-5 %  Ž 3%  none  required  2-4%  Ž 3%  none  required  1-7%  Ž 2%  none  required
assets
Unadjusted  return  on ave. equity  9-18%  12-16%  none  required  6-11%  Ž  12%  none  required  4-32%  Ž  12%  none  required
Operational  self-sufficiency-  %  110-140%  > 115%  Ž 115%  118-147%  Ž  115%  none  required  107-148%  Ž 115%  none  required
Financial  self-sufficiency  - %  95-125%  >  100%  Ž 100%  103-127%  Ž  115%  none  required  103-137%  Ž  110%  none  required
Administrative  expense  as %  15-20%  < 15%  none  required  7-15%  < 12%  none  required  4-15%  < 10%  none  required
of average assets
V.  Credit Risk  *  t
Delinquency  as % of loans  2-6%  <5%  5%  7-10%  < 5%  S 5%  1-6.5%  < 5%  5-10%
> 90 days overdue (P.A.R.)
Loan  loss  reserve  as % of  0.5-2 %  Ž 2%  2-5 %  1 -3 %  > 3%  Ž 3%  0.75-2.5%  Ž 5%  Ž 5%
total loan portfolio
Loan  loss  reserve  as % of  not  available  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  not available  100%  100%
portfolio  at risk
Portfolio  concentration:
20 largest  borrowers  as  not  available  minimize  none  required  not available  minimize  None  required  not available  minimize  ￿  25%
% of loan portfolio
Loans  to DOSRI  as % of  not available  < 5%  < 5%  not  available  < 5%  c 5%  not available  s equity  of  ￿  5%
institutional capital  . _  borrower
Sectoral and geographical  not available  minimize  none  required  not available  minimize  None  required  not available  minimize  < 10%
concentration
23Accompanying Notes to Table 5
A.  Range  of Observed  Values  of financial  risk  indicators:
For Category  A MFIs the indicators  used are those for Fundacion  Integral  Campesina  (FINCA) in Costa Rica, La Asociacion  Dominicana  para el
Desarrollo  de la Mujer (ADOPEM)  and  Asociacion  para el Desarrollo  de Microempresa  Inc. (ADEMI)  in the Dominican  Republic,  Kenya  Rural Enterprise
Programme  (K-REP)  in Kenya,  and Alexandra  Business  Association  (ABA)  in Egypt as reported  in Christen  et al. (1995),  supplemented  by data from
Benjamin  and Ledgerwood  (1998,  draft),  and  The Microbanking  Bulletin,  v.  no. 1 (1997)  and no. 2 (1998).
For Category  B MFIs  the indicators  used are those  for Union Popular  Credit Union (Tiquisate),  UPA  Credit Union (Amatitlan)  and 20 core credit union
members  in the National  Credit  Union  Federation  (FENACOAC)  in Guatemala,  as reported  in Almeyda  and Branch  (1997,  draft).
For Category  C MFIs  the indicators  used  are  those  for the Lembagan  Perkreditan  Desa  (LPD)  community-owned  village  banks  and the Bank Rakyat  Unit
Desas  in Indonesia,  and Banco  Solidario  S.A. (BancoSol)  in Bolivia,  as reported  in Christen  et al. (1995).
B.  Suggested  values  of financial  risk indicator  thresholds  for internal  governance  and external  supervision  (Columns  6 and 7, Category  B) for credit  unions  and
savings  and  credit  cooperative  societies  (Category  B) are  taken  from Richardson  (WOCCU,  1997).
C.  Suggested  threshold  values of financial  risk indicators  for external  regulation  (Column  4, Category  A) apply only to NGO MFIs  availing of an exemption
provision  for limited deposit-taking  under  the banking law and/or  receiving  authorization  for mobilizing  wholesale  deposits  through commercial  paper
issues,  large-value  certificates  of deposit  or investment  certificates  from the bank  supervisory  authority.
D.  Suggested  threshold  values of financial  risk indicators  for external  regulation  (Column  10, Category  C) apply  primarily  to MFIs  obtaining  authorization  and
license  from the bank regulatory  authority  to operate  as specialized  banks or financial  institutions. The limitation  may pertain  to geographical  limits  on
operations  (county-wide  or regional,  but not nationwide),  exclusion  of trust and foreign  exchange/foreign  trade-related  services,  and/or  exclusion  from
provision  of demand  deposit  services.
While  the Basle  Agreement  permits  a gearing  ratio  value of 8:1 for risk-weighted  assets  to capital,  this paper  supports  a lower limit equivalent  to 80% of
the Basle  ratio  for MFI  banks  because  of the nature  of risks in microfinance  and access  to capital  of organizers,  promoters  and  shareholders  of licensed-
bank  MFIs. In lieu of a risk  assets  : capital  ratio  some  countries  use a ceiling  on the ratio  of liabilities  to capital. Setting  a limit on funding liabilities  at 8-
times  capital results  in a 6.5:1  approximate  ratio  of risk assets : capital,  assuming  that the value of loans  outstanding  does not exceed  80% of average
total assets.  The interrelationship  among  the variables  in the balance sheet supports  the position put forward  in this paper that MFIs would be well
served  to observe  more  stringent  and lower  gearing  ratios  than  those permitted  in the Basle  or national  standards.
24Economics  Institute  and CGAP,  24 guidelines  developed  and disseminated  by WOCCU  for universal  use
by credit unions, and the case study analyses  of performance  and financial results of various types of
MFIs undertaken  by the Sustainable  Banking with the Poor Project (SBP), all of which were readily
available  in published  form.  25
58. Because of the institutional structure of MFIs and the nature of the microfinance business, the
categories of risk that are most relevant to MFIs are balance sheet structure, profitability, capital
adequacy,  credit risk, liquidity  and operational  risk. The aspects  of these categories  of risk as they apply
to operations  of different types of MFIs are discussed  in the sections  that follow. The discussions  also
identify the financial  indicators that are considered  to be important for internal governance  and where
warranted  prudential  external guidelines. It should be noted that the presentation  of key indicators for
categories  of risks is not intended to provide across-the-board  comparison  among the different types of
MFIs in the continuum. The  proper comparison  of MFIs should  be limited  to MFIs of the same type.
Risks in the balance  sheet structure
59. The risks embodied in the balance sheet structure should be analyzed to assess the significance  of
discrete changes  in the composition  and quality of asset and liability items because their structure  has a
direct impact  on profitability.  The growth in the size ofMFIs' balance sheets is usually  higher than that
for commercial  banks and individual  components  of the balance sheet of a dynamic institution will be
changing in response to market conditions.  The important  items for examination  and measurement  are
those areas  where the business and product  mix of the institution  change,  resulting in important  structural
changes to its balance sheet and income statement  and consequently  how it should manage the diverse
risks it faces.
60. The ability to source funds from the public results in less reliance on grants and donations,  but it
brings on the additional  burden and responsibility  of ensuring  that revenue  is sufficient  to pay interest on
wholesale  deposits and that liquidity  is maintained  to service  deposit  withdrawals. A fewMFIs  are able
to access wholesale funding from offshore markets, such as ADEMI in the Dominican Republic and
BancoSol  in Bolivia. When an MFI takes out foreign  currency  loans or wholesale  deposits it must have
access to adequate mechanisms to mitigate foreign exchange risk, ensure convertibility  and provide
reserves  for its exposure  to foreign  exchange  risk.
61. The key indicators  of risk from the balance  sheet structure  are changes  in the size and composition  of
earning and non-earning assets relative to total assets not only for a given year but over several time
periods. The experience  of a number  of MFIs indicates  generally  rapid expansion  rates of loans and high
growth  rates of total assets over time, particularly  in the first 5 - 7 years of operations. Rapid portfolio
expansion and asset growth, however, should be managed carefully and matched by maintenance in
overall asset quality.  Growth has to be balanced with commensurate  growth and diversification in
funding sources  as well as in capital,  which sets constraints  on overall asset growth.
24 The Microfinance  Program of the Economics Institute has published  information from its database in MicroBanking
Bullettin,  vol. I No. 1, 1997.
25 Robert  Peck Christen,  Elisabeth  Rhyne,  Robert  C. Vogel  and Cressida  McKean,  Maximizing  the Outreach  of Microenterprise
Finance:  An Analysis of Successful  Microfinance  Programs,  USAID  Program  and Operations  Assessment  Report No.
10, Washington,  DC, July 1995; Richardson,  op. cit., and McDonald  P. Benjamin  and Joanna Ledgerwood,  "The
Association  for the Development  of Microenterprises  (ADEMI):  Demnocratising  Credit  in the Dominican  Republic",  The
World  Bank Project  on Sustainable  Banking  with  the Poor (Draft),  January  1998.
2562. The items to focus on with respect to the liabilities side will be changes in the size, composition,
financial  costs and relative importance  of different sources  of funds. Growth  rates should be related to
growth  in total assets not just for a specific  year but over several  time periods. The  relationships  between
wholesale funds and capital, and between retail deposits from the public vis-a-vis capital indiicate  the
degree of leveraging, and should be  closely monitored in internal governance processes to ensure
compliance  with authorized  limits. The strategic  differentiators  for the types of MFIs are the sources of
qualifying capital and reliance on donor and government  funds for onlending,  access to and costs of
wholesale  deposits,  and the ability to mobilize  retail deposits  from the public.
63. Insofar as the balance sheet structure  is concerned,  prudential  guidelines  that may be set by external
regulators for observance are triggered only by specific liabilities-generating  activities of MFIs. The
regulatory  framework  model highlighted  earlier  in Table 2 shows  that limited deposit-taking  by Type 2 -
4 MFIs should be under an exemption  provision in the banking  law; funding through wholesale deposit
substitutes  should  be in accordance  with securities  law; and funding through limited and unlimited  retail
deposits should  be with authorization  from the supervisory  authorities.
64. Reaching threshold levels in liabilities-generating  activities trigger requirements  to satisfy external
regulatory requirements, particularly on  capital adequacy levels, and  compliance with  additional
prudential guidelines on balance sheet structure items.  These additional asset-side guidelines may
include limits on risk-weighted  assets as a multiple  of qualifying  capital,  procedures  for classification  of
loan portfolio, loan loss provisioning  measures,  liquidity  reserves,  periodic reports, on-site surveillance,
etc.  These are discussed  under the appropriate  risk categories  in subsequent  sections.
Solvency and capital adequacy
65. An adequate  capital  base acts as a safety  net for the risks to which an institution  is exposed,  absorbing
possible losses and providing a basis for maintaining confidence  among investors, lending institutions
and depositors. Capital is the ultimate determinant  of the institution's  lending  capacity  because  assets are
funded  by deposits,  borrowings  and capital.  Assets cannot  be expanded  beyond the limit of risk-weighted
capital-to-asset  ratio mandated  by external  regulators,  or set as an operating  policy in internal  governance.
Consequently,  the availability  and cost of capital  are determinants  of the maximum  level of assets.
66. The relationship  of equity or qualifying capital to total assets measures the extent to which  capital
has been, and can continue  to be leveraged  to support  the asset base. The relationship  between  equity or
qualifying  capital  and total liabilities  provides  the measure  of how much  the MFI has borrowed,  and can
continue  to borrow from others on the strength  of its capital base. For both non-regulated  and regulated
MFIs, voluntary governance through self-regulation  requires maintaining levels of leverage 1that  are
more  strict and conservative  than those permitted  by prudential  guidelines  of regulatory authorities.
67. The relationship between required minimum capital and current earnings retained and excludedfrom
distribution  as dividends  is an important  determinant  of future growth and commitment  of management,
directors and shareholders  to the institution's financial health.  Regulated  MFIs should give special
attention to  this particular indicator because bank regulators can be  reasonably expected to raise
minimum capitalization  levels from time to time, and maintaining  a healthy surplus over the minimum
helps to prepare  an MFI for future  increases.
68. The relationship  between  total loans and equity provides  a measure  of the multiple  by whic:h  equity
has been stretched  to generate  the principal  income-earning  asset. Furthermore,  the relationship  can also
26provide a  measure of  the extent to  which the quality of the  loan portfolio can deteriorate into
nonperforming  or nonrecoverable  status before  equity  or qualifying  capital  is adversely  impacted.
69. Regulators  must ensure that capital  requirements  focus  on providing  an adequate  buffer against which
losses on asset portfolios can be written off. This ensures that depositors (or institutionalized  explicit
deposit insurance  schemes)  will only absorb losses once shareholders'  funds  have been exhausted.  It is
practically  impossible  to accurately  measure  the minimum  amount of capital necessary  to avoid the risk
of loss for depositors, and no amount of capital will ever be adequate in the hands of incompetent
management.  Even competent  management  will make errors of judgment in a business involving the
management  of a series  of risks.
70. For MFIs that are permitted wholesale  funding activities  through commercial  paper securities,  or to
operate as limited deposit-taking  institutions (as in Hong Kong, Bolivia or Peru) external regulators
should impose minimum levels of capitalization  upon entry, maintenance  of risk-weighted  asset-to-
qualifying  capital levels more strict than those for licensed  retail deposit-taking  institutions,  and liquidity
reserve  requirements.
Income statement structure
71. The measurement  of efficiency  in banking and financial  institutions  is difficult and elusive because
there is no satisfactory definition of their "output" or product.  Comparisons based on operating costs and
margins must be used cautiously because of significant differences aimiong  institutions in capital structure
and  leverage, business  mix, range and  quality of services, inflation rates  and accounting practices  on
valuation  of assets.26 Other  factors  which  affect  profitability  and: efficiency  in intermediation  of a
financial institution, bank or MFI must also be considered:
- First, inflation has the effect of increasing operating costs faster than income in most cases.
*  Second, financial institutions  operate on traditional fixed margins, resulting  in the  limited
ability  of financial institutions,  including MFIs  to adjust their  pricing  of loans when  the
interest cost of borrowings and deposits have been increased.
. In turn, the above two factors directly impact the ability of an MFI to accumulate and build
up institutional capital to maintain internally- and externaily-set sustainability goals.
72. The need to generate profits implies the need to manage risk.  Liquidity and interest rate management
have  become  accepted  approaches  to  profitability  management.  Since  capital  and  profitability  are
intimately  linked,  the  key  objective  is to  ensure  sustained  profitability  so  that  a  MFI  can  increase
institutional capital from operations.  A choice cannot be made between the pursuit of adequate interest
margins and the control of risk as they are interrelated, and interest margins are a direct consequence of
the risks involved and the ability to manage such risks.
73. Many financial and organizational factors determine the long-term sustainability of an MFI and its
operations. 27  On the financial side, an MFI must consistently maintain low levels of portfolio at risk
and high on-time repayment and loan recovery rates, because  continued and growing loan  losses will
26 Dimitri Vittas, Measuring Commercial Bank Efficiency, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 806, Washington,
DC: The World Bank, 1991
27 Three technical guides available for the analysis of financial statements of MFIs are: Financial Ratio Analysis of  Micro-
Finance Institutions, The SEEP Network: New York, 1995; Technical Guide for the Analysis of Microenterprise Finance
Institutions,  Inter-American  Development  Bank:  Washington,  DC,  1994,  and  Joanna  Ledgerwood,  Financial
Management Training for Micro-Finance Organizations: Finance Study Guide, CALMEADOW: Toronto, 1996.
27erode its capital base.  An MFI must earn a level of income from lending operations sufficient  for the
following requirements:
a)  cover the financial cost of funds used: a positive netfinancial  margin,
b)  cover operating and administrative expenses: operating self-sufficiency, measured by the ratio of
operating income to operating expenses,
c)  cover all  financial and operating expenses, including the building up of reserves  for loan losses
and  exchange  risks,  and  mitigating  the  effects  of  inflation  on  its  operations: fincancial self-
sufficiency,  measured  by  the  ratio  of  operating  income  to  total  adjusted  costs  (including
adjustments for subsidies), and
d)  contribute  to  the  enlargement of  its capital base,  after  generating a  competitive  return  to  its
shareholders: return on average equity, measured by the ratio of net operating income to average
net worth. Return on average assets provides a measure  of how profitably resources  are being
employed in the asset base to generate profits.  The two indicators are adjusted to smooth out the
effects of price  inflation and subsidies in order to provide accurate comparison of profitability
levels from one time period to another.
74. Regulation  should  not  depress  the  profitability  of  banks  and  regulated  financial  intermediaries.
Excessive  liquidity requirements  through high  levels of mandated  reserves, together  with qjuantitative
quotas  on  loans  for  target  sectors  increase  financial  costs,  damage  profits  and  may  encourage
disintermediation. Supervisory authorities need to recognize the importance of profitability  and actively
encourage  banks  and  regulated  financial  institutions  to  maximize  it,  because  a  sound  banking  and
financial system is based on profitable and adequately capitalized institutions. As indicated in Table 5 no
mandatory profitability indicators are proposed because it is not within the scope of regulators'  authority
to dictate how MFIs and financial institutions should operate their businesses.
Liquidity risks
75. A controversial  issue in microfinance is the balance between benefits and risks  of offering deposit
services. For MFIs deposit-taking is a way to fund outreach expansion while reducing reliance on donor
support  and,  for  poor  households.  For  poor  households,  deposit  facilities  in MFIs  can  provide  a
convenient medium for savings which might otherwise not exist.  Mobilizing deposits establishes an MFI
program  as a  financial  intermediary  rooted  in the  community  and not just  a  channel  for  delivering
external funds.28 It can also enhance loan repayment levels when borrowers see their own neighbors and
relatives as the ultimate source of their loans.
76. However, mobilizing deposits is a heavy responsibility forMFIs because their depositors are at risk
of  losing  their  savings  if  an  MFI  without  formal  deposit-taking  authorization  fails  due  to  poor
management  or  vulnerability  to  adverse  external  events.  When MFIs  accept  deposits,  regulatory
authorities may have no choice except to bail out depositors whether or not deposit insurance is formally
in place. The conclusion is that mobilizing voluntary deposits beyond certain thresholds should be subject
to prudential regulation as well as mandatory coverage under formal deposit insurance schemes.29
28 Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) Focus Note No. 8, op. cit.
29  In some countries where savings and credit cooperatives are not part of the formal deposit insurance system,  members'
deposits are "self-insured" through deposit insurance schemes in district or regional federations.
2877. In managing liquidity  risk the important  factors  to focus on are the relationships  between (i) readily
liquifiable and marketable assets vis-a-vis deposits from the public and/or wholesale deposits and
borrowings, and (ii) interest- and tern-sensitive deposits and borrowed funds vis-a-vis total public
deposits and wholesale  funds. The extent of concentration  in funding;  sources  which is measured  by the
percentage  of total deposits and/or borrowed  funds  consisting  of funds from the 10 largest depositors  or
fund-placers  is likewise  important  because  it indicates  the degree  of dependence  and vulnerability  an MFI
may have  on particular  types of funds  sources.
Credit  risk
78. Sound credit risk management  entails the identification  of existing and potential risks inherent in
lending activities. This involves  the implementation  of clearly defined policies setting forth theMFI's
credit risk philosophy and the parameters  under which credit risk is to be controlled. Control involves
limiting  risk through procedures  that ensure adequate  portfolio diversification.  Clearly defined levels of
authority for credit approval also help ensure that credit decisions are prudent and within defined
parameters.  The maintenance  of detailed, up-to-date information o]1  borrowers is a pre-requisite for
ongoing risk assessment by internal auditors and management.  An effective reporting system must
generate  accurate  and timely  reports for management,  the board of directors  or trustees,  external  auditors
and independent  credit rating agencies  concerning  the extent of an MFI's credit risk exposure,  as well as
the status of its loan  portfolio.
79. The loan portfolio of MFIs differs from that of other financial institutions in that the majority of
microfinance  loans are very short-term  in duration  and are unsecured.  This fundamental  characteristic  of
microfinance  lending calls for close attention to key indicators of credit risk and tools for managing
portfolio quality, which are described  below. While the indicators can signal  potential problems,  it will
be indispensable  to maintain  close contact with clients and their businesses  in order to make informed
assessments  of their ability  and willingness  to repay loans.
a)  Portfolio at risk: the relationship of loans with past due payments  2 90 days, to total loan
portfolio.  For MFIs internal guidelines for strict measurement of  all loans with overdue
payments  greater than 30 days is relevant  because  most MFI loans are short-term  and unsecured.
The longer  the overdue  period,  the greater the  probability  of an uncollectible  problem  loan.
b)  Measures of on-time repayment  rate and loan recovery rate are indispensable for controlling
portfolio  risk, as are  patterns of delinquency  according  to sector  or geographical  market area;
c)  Risk-weighted  classification  of the loan portfolio is an important area of internal governance
procedure  that is worth standardizing  for universal  application  by MFIs, simply  because it makes
good management  practice.
d)  Aging profile  of  the loan portfolio identifies and classifies overdue loans by age and  is
indispensable  for managing  loan  portfolio  quality.
e)  Adequacy  of loan loss  provisions  relative  to total overdue  loans  provides a measure  of whether  or
not reserves  for loan losses  are under-provided  and capital  adequacy  or solvency  is understated.
f)  Other sources  of credit risk requiring  attention  are  sectoral  or geographical  concentration  and the
board-approved  internal  limits and procedures  for loan approval  and loan  classification.
80. With respect to external regulation,  only the MFIs with banking or finance company licenses are
subject  to  the  portfolio quality  and  credit  risk  management procedures specified by  a  bank
superintendent.  Attempting  to place mandatory  prudential  guidelines  on credit risk management  by non-
regulated  MFIs will only serve to stifle the innovation  and flexibility  possible in an unregulated  operating
environment.
29Interest rate  risk
81. The interest rate risk commonly faced  by MFIs is directly linked to their ability to adjust  interest
rates on their microfinance loans vis-a-vis the interest expenses that are incurred for borrowed funds from
commercial banks and similar institutions. An MFI that can legitimately access deposits faces risks on the
interest expenses it incurs to mobilize such deposits.  In periods of volatility of interest rates on deposits,
MFIs can be significantly exposed to interest rate risk.  In addition, MFIs will face adverse impacts on
profitability and capital adequacy.
Market  risk
82. Market  risk  arises  from  the  capital gain  or loss  that  may  result  from  investments  made  by  an
institution  in commodity,  fixed interest-instruments, equity or currency markets.  Among  the financial
risks that MFIs must confront and manage, this category of risks is of lesser significance because of the
nature of their operations and the reduced availability of resources for such investments.
Currency  risk
83. Experience  indicates  that  some MFIs  have  currency  risk  exposure  because  of  foreign-currency
resources mobilized through borrowings from international banks and wholesale US Dollar certificates of
deposit.  The currency risk exposure arises because the liabilities are denominated in foreign currency,
while assets are denominated in local currency.  This is a classic case of currency mismatch in assets and
liabilities.  Another  form of  currency risk  arises  from the  inability  to convert  from local  to  foreign
currency in a  timely manner.  When a currency mismatch  occurs in the balance  sheet, the usual risk-
management approach is to obtain forward foreign exchange cover which is normally available for short-
term  (i.e.,  one-year  or  less)  periods.  The  other  approach  is  to  "self-insure"  by  establishing  and
accumulating a special reserve fund for adverse changes in the exchange rate.30
Operational  Risk
84. Microfinance programs that have been successful, cost-effective and transparent are characterized by
comparatively high volumes and low margins, decentralized operations and on-field delivery of financial
services directly to borrowing and depositing clients at the locations where they carry out their business.
The application of these specialized technologies works only with skilled and trained staff at all levels of
the  organization,  efficient  telecommunications  and  transportation  facilities,  and  an  effective  set  of
management  information,  reporting  and internal  control systems.  These technologies  make  internal
control and  up-to-date management information systems indispensable.  The lack of written operating
policies, procedures, manuals and systems can signal exposure to substantial operational risk.  The more
important items consist of written policies on loan approval process, loan authority limits, loan portfolio
classification and loan loss write-offs, MIS reporting system and formally-constituted audit procedures.
30 This self-insurance  system  is the practice  adopted  by Asociacion  para el Desarrollo  de la Microempresa,  Inc. (ADEMI)  in
the Dominican  Republic  with  respect  to its long-term  borrowings  from the European  Investment  Bank.
30V. Summary  and Conclusions
Summary  of issues addressed
85. The paper developed a working model of a regulatory framework for managing the different kinds of
risks  inherent  in microfinance  operations. The model which is  illustrated  in Table  2 emphasizes risk
management as a dynamic continuing process (as opposed to static ratio management) and recommends
a licensing requirement for some categories of MFIs in the continuum, based on a threshold of funding
generated from the general public through retail deposits.
86. The discussion has emphasized that the fundamental responsibility for regulation of an MFI rests on
the shareholders and the governing board they have appointed. Vigilant and competent internal regulation
is a common necessity for the continuum of MFIs discussed in this paper.  The analysis highlighted the
point  that  liability-generating  activities  beyond  certain  thresholds  trigger  the  need  for  external
regulation. When  an MFI becomes subject to regulation,  regulators then  impose prudential  guidelines
over portfolio quality, exposure to credit risk and liquidity levels, which are asset side activities.
87. The analysis  also led to a delineation in the sharing of responsibilities and accountabilities  for risk
management  among several key players.  The financial risk management approach  to good corporate
governance is useful in analyzing the incidence of responsibility and the quality of performance of those
key players.  Bank regulators cannot (and should not always) prevent  bankfailures.  Their primary role
is  to act  as  facilitators  in  an effective process  of risk management  and to  evaluate  and  enhance  the
statutory  framework and  environment  under which  regulated  banks  and MFIs  can pursue  an  orderly
process of institutional development and transformation.
Major  conclusions  of the study and recommended  action
88. The  discussion  generated  some  principal  conclusions  about  regulating  the  organization  and
operations of various categories of MFIs.  The conclusions arrived at are enumerated below:
*  Require  standard registration documents and procedures -- no  different than  those imposed on
regular  corporate  entities  --  including  the  designation  of a  central  governmental  agency  for
registration as corporate entities;
*  Establish clearly understood thresholds for fund-mobilization from the general public as well as
the non-public wholesale sectors which should require registration, reporting and monitoring, and
compliance with registration and licensing procedures;
*  Allow minor  deposit-taking  under  an exclusion  provision  in  the banking  law, and  authorize
wholesale deposit-funding  linked to registration and minimum  capital requirements  for certain
types of MFIs not licensed as banks;
*  Allow limited deposit-taking activities from the public under  a limitation provision (linked to a
risk assets-to-capital or liabilities-to-capital level lower than the limit for regular banks) together
with requirements for maintaining liquidity reserves;
*  Establish recommended limits on issuance of wholesale deposit substitute instruments, linked to
registration and minimum capitalization requirements;
*  Establish internal govemance and self-regulation structures and processes.  Ratios are useful only
as  complementary  tools  in  the  exercise  of  prudent  management  by  the  board  and  senior
management.
*  Authorize unrestricted deposit-taking for MFIs which can satisfy the same prudential guidelines
on  capital  adequacy  as  licensed  commercial  banks,  even  though  the  required  minimum
31capitalization may be set at levels lower than those for regular commercial banks. It should be
noted that many countries'  banking laws do not allow for tiered-banking, under which licensed
but  specialized  banks  can be  established  at  levels  of minimum  capital  lower  than  those  for
"4universal"  banks; 31
89. The experience  in Bolivia, Peru and  the Philippines with lower  minimum capital requirements  for
specialized  institutions  licensed  to  carry  out  limited  banking  operations  demonstrates  the  use  of  a
minimum capitalization requirement as a standard of entry rather than a barrier to entry.  In the recent
reforms to its banking laws, Nicaragua will permit the establishment ofnonbank  financial entities with a
non-profit  charter, a specialized microfinance and  SME focus and shareholder capital at  a level lower
than  that  for  regular commercial  (multiple)  banks,32 The  application  of  a liability-to-capital  ceiling
would  complement  the  standard  of  entry  aspect  of  minimum  capitalization,  becoming  a  positive
inducement for striving to increase capital (and the resulting capacity to expand microlending) over time.
Considerations for governments, donors and MFIs
90. The worldwide inventory of microfinance institutions undertaken by the World Bank indicates that as
of  September  1995, some  $7 billion  in  loans to more  than  13 million  individuals  and  groups  were
outstanding  in the 206 institutions  that responded to the survey  These institutions had  also mobilized
over $19 billion in 45 million active deposit accounts. 33 Supporting the survival and developmrent  of the
economic activities of the poor has become one of the priorities of the policy agenda of the 1990s.
91. The financial  system  as a whole  continues to evolve and  find new  ways to  service demands  for
financial  services in the emerging markets.  The innovative and rapid development  of many  localized
efforts to provide financial services to the poor outside of formal channels has generally overtaken taken
policy formulation by  governments.  The reaction of some governments (e.g., Bosnia, Bangladesh and
others) and  multilateral  agencies  (e.g., Asian Development Bank) 34 is unfavorable  to microfinance  -
comprehensive regulation is being proposed for microfinance activities and institutions through mandated
standards of performance  and risk-ratios.  These proposals are based  on untested  hypothesis about the
institutional  and  market  impact of moving  from an unregulated environment  to one  that  is as  tightly
regulated as formal banks and financial institutions.
92. Institutions  specializing  in  supporting  and  promoting  the  development  of  microenterprise
development  and microfinance  services, such as the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest  (CGAP),
US Agency for International Development, Microfinance Program at the Economics Institute in Boulder,
Colorado,  ACCION International,  and  Women's  World Banking  to name  a  few,  have  initiated  and
promoted efforts to bring about a supportive policy and institutional environment formicrofinance.  This
is being  done by promoting  and  intensifying  dialogue among  the key  participants  in microfinance  --
government regulatory agencies, microfinance practitioners and donors.  Aside from assistance  through
staff training and dissemination by  seminars, workshops and publications to increase the awareness and
31  "Tiered-banking"  exists  in a  few  countries  (e.g.,  the Philippines,  Indonesia,  Peru)  where  specialized  banks  may  be
established  at  capitalization  levels much  lower  than  for  regular  universal banks,  but  with  operations  limited  to
specifically-defined geographical areas and deposit-taking limited to savings and fixed deposits.
32  In El Salvador, the thrust is to reform the law on Federacion de las Cajas de Credito and Bancos de los Trabajadores, which
will permit a new type of financial institution with lower capitalization requirements, taking deposits from the public and
providing loans primarily to microenterprises and small businesses.
33  Julia Paxton and Carlos Cuevas, A Worldwide Inventory of Microfinance Institutions, Sustainable Banking wiith the Poor
(SBP) Project.  Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1997.
34  Philippines - National Summit of the Coalition for Microfinance Standards, August 20, 1998.
32use  of  best  practice  methodologies  in microfinance  operations,  donors  can be  very  instrumental  in
providing  policy  guidance and  technical assistance  not only in conceptualizing  but also  in the  actual
setting up of tiered and graduated regulatory structures within which mi -rofinance can reach the unserved
and underserved economic sectors.
Information, disclosure  and  reporting  requirements  and standards
93. One of the foundations for a viable prudential regulatory framework is the collection, organization
and  provision  of  operating  and  financial  information  on  a timely  basis,  under  a  well-organized  and
orderly reporting system.  The comprehensive and integrated risk management partnership among the key
players  requires  the  provision  and  sharing  of  information  among  several  of  the  key  players.  The
information on operations and financial results of an organization is generated periodically for the use of
management and the organization's  supervisory board.  The informatiorn  to be shared with outside third
parties will depend on the requirements of external auditors, donors, regulators and outside stakeholders
such as depositors, clients and credit-rating agencies.  However, few MFIs are legally required to disclose
their  financial  condition  with  the  rigor  demanded  of  licensed  banks,  which  makes  meaningful
comparisons of MFI financial statements rather difficult.
94. If they  are  operating  prudently,  NGO MFIs  which  are not  subject to  any  form of  regulation  or
supervision by government regulatory agencies will maintain information  systems, records and reports
for their own internal use.  These will include the quality of the loan portfolio,  the organization's  status
as regards operating and full financial self-sufficiency, the management of liquidity, liabilities and capital
funds.  To some extent, these important pieces of information are available and can be provided to donors
and other stakeholders without any undue burdens on the MFI.
95. The  question  of what  specific  minimum  standards  of perfonnance  are  relevant  to  or  should  be
required of MFIs in different non-regulated and regulated categories -- whether by donors, government
regulators, stakeholders or independent credit rating agencies -- is a more difficult issue.  The difficulty
arises  from the need  to recognize differences  in country settings and accepted social  and commercial
practices and  conventions, but also because  of the variety of microfinance  institutions  and their client
base.  The global experience in capital markets development has demonstrated the ability of independent,
private sector-organized credit rating agencies to establish credible market-based performance standards,
and may provide insights into how standards for microfinance institutions might be developed.
96.  The Microfinance Program of the Economics Institute in Boulder, Colorado and CGAP are involved
in a project to develop a database on the financial performance of MFIIs,  to help MFI managers improve
their understanding of the performance of their own individual institultoens  through comparison with data
from similar MFIs in their peer group.  This is similar to the use by managers of commercial banks and
other  businesses  of  peer  group  analysis  as  a  valuable  management  tool.  Confidential  reports  to
participating MFIs on their individual financial performance in the conte,;t of an appropriate peer  group
are the main product of the project.  The secondary output is a semi-annual MicroBanking Bulletin which
provides a broader audience with statistical financial data on participating  MiIFls  as a whole as well as on
peer groups of such MFIs.
97. The  World  Bank  can provide  assistance  through  staff  training  and  dissemination  by  seminars,
workshops  and  publications,  to  increase  the  awareness  and  use  of  best  practice  methodologies  in
microfinance  operations.  Building strong institutional management and financial performance should be
the focus  of technical  assistance  and  a  prerequisite  for obtaining  access to World Bank loans.  As  a
specific example, the World Bank has elaborated policies relevant for len.dig to financial intermediaries,
33which supports  countries  to strengthen  their financial  sector  policy framework,  build institutional  capacity
to function competitively  in markets  (including rural, microfinance  and SME sectors).  The policies
explicitly recognize  specialized  institutions  such as MFIs, as acceptable  channels, and support to these
institutions  is not considered  as directed  credit. The CGAP program coordinated  by the World Bank has
introduced a new institutional  approach  anchored  on a business-like  partnership  in which the roles and
responsibilities  of the donor and MFI partner are clearly  defined  and delineated. The donor assumes the
role of an  investor,  with institutional  perfornance of the MFI substituting  for dividends  a its return on
that investment. 35
Final observations
98. The usefulness  of the model for a regulatory  framework  developed  in this paper will depend on the
collection and organization of operating and financial information on a timely basis, under a well-
organized  and orderly  reporting  system. The comprehensive  and integrated  risk management  partnership
among the key players requires  the provision and sharing of information  among the key players about
their discharge of respective  responsibilities. Since the organization  and preparation of financial and
operating  information  can become  an additional  burden to the staff and resources  ofMFIs there is need to
continue  the effort to simplify  information  requirements  for government  agencies  and donors.
99. Building  the institutional  capacity  ofMFIs enables  microfinance  practitioners  as a group to influence
the design of policies and information  reporting standards set by government  agencies and by donors.
For instance, the Regional Action Research model encourages the development and formation of
microfinance  networks and has been an important  tool for enhancing  the capability of MFIs to work
closely  together in their dialogue  with donors  and policy makers.  36  The build  up of institutional  capacity
should enable the directors  and managers  of MFIs to develop  efficient management  information  systems
for  identifying and  managing risks  and  satisfy  relevant data  and  information requirements of
stakeholders. There is an urgent  need for donors  to synchronize  their information  requirements  to avoid
imposing  undue additional  costs and operating  burdens  on MFIs. In this regard,  the collaborative  work  of
CGAP and the Microfinance  Program of the Economics  Institute to establish a database through the
MicroBanking  Bulletin can  be an indispensable  foundation  for synchronized  standards  of inforrnation.
100.  For MFIs the principal  challenge  is to build  up the institutional  capacity  to expand  client outreach
and secure the financial  sustainability  of their operations. Some  microenterprise  development  programs
provide both financial and non-financial  services to their clients.  Non-financial  services vary widely
according to the socio-economic  environment  and the perceived constraints -- lack of business skills,
market connections,  etc. -- faced  by the target clientele. For these institutions,  there is a distinct need to
introduce  and adopt sound  commercial  practices into their financial  activities as well as to forrmalize  the
provision of operating information. These are best achieved  through exposure  to and application  of best
practice techniques for managing risk, reducing administrative  costs, increasing  revenue and collection
and organization  of information  which is necessary  for internal  management  and control systerms.
35  "Anatomy of a Micro-finance Deal: The New Approach to Investing in Micro-Finance Institutions", Consultative Group to
Assist the Poorest, The World Bank, Focus Note No. 9, August 1997.
36  "Regional  Action  Research on  Sustainable Micro-Finance  Institutions in  Africa: Basic Guidelines",  The  World  Bank,
Washington,  DC  (1997). The five-year action-research program, which was initiated  in  1994 to  support  innovative
techniques  and  effective  networking,  currently  covers  six countries  in  the  Africa region:  Kenya,  Ghana,  Zambia,
Ethiopia, Cameroon and Mozambique.
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35Schedule  19 Summary  of South African  Exemption  Notice
1.  The South  African  Banks  Act of 1990  establishes  the statutory  definition  of  the "business  of a bank" and,
subject to the approval  of the Minister  of Finance,  designates  limited financial  intermediation  activities  that are
explicitly  excluded from the legal definition of banking business. The exclusion notice took effect January 1, 1995.
2.  As provided  for in the Banlans  Act,  the exemption  notice  pertains  to any financial  intermnediation  activity  carried
out by a group, among whose members  exists a common bond.  The law provides  very clear clefinitions  and
specifications  of the following  aspects  of common  bond  groups,  registration,  reporting  and  excluded  activities:
*  What constitutes a coWmrmon  bond,
*  Types of associations that satisfy this common bond requirement (e.g., employees' credit union or savings and
credit  cooperative,  "stokvel",  housing  finance  cooperative),
*  Deposit-receiving  and fumd-disbursing  or lending  activities  of the group  and its members  that are excluded
from the definition  of banking  business,
*  Compliance-  with  requirements  for registration  with  appropriate  government  authorities,  submission  thereto  of
audited financial accounts and operating reports and publication of financial reports, and
*  Monetary  ceilings  (less  than  RI mnillion  for Group  I and between  Rl million  to R9.99  million  for  Group II) on
the amount  of members'  subscriptions  that  may be held  by the common  bond association  in order to continue
to qualify  for  the exclusion  notice.
3.  In  other countries (e.g.,  Colombia, Bclivia,  Honduras, Sri Lanka,  Philippines, Taiwan,  Canada and  the
Netherlands)  common bond associations  and organizations  are established  and operate under the jurisdiction of a
Cooperatives  Law which specifies  requiremn-ents  for registration  and reporting,  permitted  activities  not subject to
banking  statutes  and income  and sales taxes  and criteria  for membership  similar  to the South  African  legal provision.
Trhe  principal  difference  and innovatiorn  in the South  African  approach  relevant  for developing  countries  is that the
exclusion  from the statutory  definition  of the "business  of a bank" is contained  in the Banking  Law itself' thereby
unifying  the supervisory  and  regulatory  jurisdiction  within  the banking  superintendency.
4.  The key provisions OIf  th- SoUlr Af.ican exclusion notice are listed below.
DEFINITIONS
1.  A 'common  bond"  exists  between
(a)  members  of a specific  group corisisting  of employees  of the same employer  who are members  of the same
savings and credit scheme that is operated  and administered  on behalf of such group of employees  in
accordance  with  set rules  agreed  upon  between  such  group  of employees  and  their  employer;  or
(b)  members  of a specific  group  that  may  be described  by the term or concept  known  as "Stokvel",  which
(i)  is a formal  or informal  rotating  credit  scherme  with  entertainment,  social  and economic  functions;
(ii)  fundamentally  consists  of members  who have pledged mutual support  to each other towards the
attainment of specific objectives;
(iii)  establishes  a continuouis  pool  of capital  by raising  funds  by means  of the subscriptions  of members;
(iv)  grants  credit  to and on behalf  of members;
(v)  provides  for  members  to share in  profits  and  to nominate  management;  and
(vi)  relies  on self-imposed  regulation  to protect  the interest  of its members;  or
(c)  members  of a specific group, govemed  in temis of rules agreed to and signed by the group's founders,
exclusively  established  for the purpose  of raising  funds and applying  or holding  available  such funds for
housing advances  to members,  irrespective  of whether or not such group  is bound  by its rules to terminate
upon  the expiration  of a fixed  period  or upon  the occurrence  of an event  specified  in  its rules; or
36(d)  members  of a specific  group  that chooses  to identify  itself  by use of the name  Credit  Union  or Savings  and
Credit  Cooperative-
(i)  which  group  consists  of persons  of similar  occupation  or profession  or who  are employed  by a common
employer  or who  are employed  within  the same  business  district,;  or
(ii)  which  group  has  common  membership  in an association  or organisation,  including  religious,  social,  co-
operative,  labour  or educational  groups;  or
(iii)  which  group  resides  within  the same  defined  community,  rural  or urban district,  and
(iv)  which  group  receives  funds  from  members  against  the issue  of stock  or by means  of the subscriptions
of members;
"employee" means  any  person  who is employed  by or working  for an employer  and is receiving  or
entitled  to receive  any  remuneration,
"employer"  means  any person  whosoever  employs  or provides  work for any person and remunerates
or expressly  or tacitly  undertakes  to remunerate  him;
"group" means  a number  of natural  persons;
"member",  in  relation  to a group  as mentioned  in subparagraph  (a), (b),  (c) and  (d),  means  a person
who contributes  towards  the funding  of the group  in  order  to obtain  any  benefit  in terms  thereof.
DESIGNATED  ACTIVITY
2.  Subject  to the conditions  set out in  paragraph  3, the acceptance  of money  by or on behalf  of a common  bond group
from such members and the pooling and utilization thereof for one or more of the following objectives:
(a)  The relief or maintenance during minority, old age, widowhood, sickness or other infirmity, whether
bodily or mental, of members or their husbands, wives, widows, widowers, children or other relatives or
dependents;
(b)  the granting  of annuities,  whether  immediate  or deferred,  to membeis  or to nominees  of members,  or the
endowment of members or nominees of members;
(c)  the provision of a sum of money to be paid or other benefit to be provided-
(i)  on the birth of a member's child;
(ii)  on the  death of  a  member or  any  other person mentioned  in paragraph (a)  or  in the  form  of  an
endowment insurance on the life of a member or such a person;
(iii)  towards the expenses in connection with the death or funeral of any member or any such person;  or
(iv)  during a period of confined mourning by a member or such a person;
(d)  the acquisition of movable goods by a member;
(e)  the acquisition of any land by a member;
(f)  the erection, on any  land, of buildings for residential or  business purposes or the acquisition of  any such
buildings by a member;
(g)  the insurance against fire or other contingencies of the implements  of the trade or calling of any member;
(h)  towards expenses in connection with any recreational or social event of a member;
(i)  the provision of a sum of money to a member on a member's leaving the services of his employer owing to
dismissal, resignation or otherwise;
(j)  the  relief  or  maintenance of  members,  or  any  group  of  members,  when unemployed  or  in  distressed
circumstances;
(k)  the provision of money for the advancement of the education or training of members or their children;
(1)  the establishment  of any business  by a member;
(m) the development  of the community  to which  the members  belong;
(n)  the provision  of means  for members  to receive  interest  or a dividend  on their  contributions.
37CONDITIONS
3.  The conditions referred to in paragraph 2 which are applicable to a common bond are the following:
(a)  none of the activities of a group may fall within the objectives of a pension fund organisation as set out in the
definition of "pension fund organization" in the Pension Funds Act, 1956;
(b)  the rules of a group shall not entitle any member at any time, albeit subject to any such notice as may be
prescribed in the rules of the group, to withdraw the full amount of his contributions;
(c)  a group as mentioned in paragraph l(b)  shall either be a member of or be affiliated to the National Stokvels
Association of South Africa ("NASASA  ") or any such similar representative self-regulatory body approved in
writing by the Registrar of Banks;
(d)  a group as mentioned paragraph 1(d) shall either be a member of or be affiliated to the Savings and Credit Co-
operative League  of South Africa  ("SACCOL  ')  or any  such  similar  representative self-regulatoty  body
approved in writing by the Registrar of Banks,
(e)  the benefits of the members of the group shall not be provided exclusively by way of loans that, in terms of the
rules of a group, must be repaid;
(f)  a group shall keep, in one of the official languages of the Republic of South Africa, such accounting records as
are necessary to fairly reflect the state of affairs and business of a group and to explain the transactions and
financial position of such group;
(g)  a group shall fix a date on which, in each year, its financial year will end, and such financial year shall be a
group's annual accounting period;
(h)  a group shall within 120 days after the end of each financial year cause annual financial statements, pertaining
to its affairs and business in respect of that financial year, to be made out in one of the official languages of the
Republic of South Africa;
(i)  a group must fit into one of the following categories:
i.  Category I: not holding from members subscriptions  amounting to more than Rl  million; or
ii.  Category II: holding from members subscriptions  amounting to more than RI million but not more than
R 9.99 million;
(j)  the financial statements of a group that fits into Category II shall be presented to a person duly registered as an
accountant  and auditor, in terms of  the Public Accountants' and  Auditors' Act,  1991 for purposes of the
drawing up and presentation of a report;
(k)  in the event that the accountant and auditor is unable to make a report or to make it without qualification, his
report shall state the facts or circumstances  that prevent him from making his report or from making it without
qualification;
(1)  for a group in Category II, copies of such audit report shall be presented within 60 days after completion:
i.  for a group as defined in paragraph I (a), to the members of and to their employer, or
ii.  for a  group in  the "Stokvel" category, to the members of  such group  and  the  National  Stokvels
Association of  South  Africa ("NASASA") or  any  such similar representative self-regulatory body
approved in writing by the Registrar of Banks; or
iii.  in the case of a group as defined in paragraph 1(c),  to the members of such group; or
iv.  in the case of a group as defined in I (d), to the members of such group and to the SACCOI or any such
similar representative self-regulatory  body approved in writing by the Registrar of Banks.
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